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A "bundled discount" occurs when a seller offers a collec-
tion of different goods for a lower price than the aggregate price
for which it would sell the constituent products individually.'
While such discounts are ubiquitous throughout the economy,
2
their legality is very much in question. In September 2002,
hospital bed maker Hill-Rom Corporation was hit with a $519
million antitrust judgment for offering bundled discounts on
packages of its standard and specialty beds, 3 and plaintiffs
1. Other commentators refer to such discounts as "multi-product dis-
counts," see Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice
Predation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 27 (2005), and the economics and marketing lit-
erature frequently term the discounting strategy "price bundling," see, e.g.,
Dilip Soman & John T. Gourville, Transaction Decoupling: How Price Bun-
dling Affects the Decision to Consume, 38 J. MARKETING RES. 30 passim
(2001).
2. See, e.g., Ward Hanson & R. Kipp Martin, Optimal Bundle Pricing, 36
MGMT. SCI. 155 (1990); Bari A. Harlam et al., Impact of Bundle Type, Price
Framing and Familiarity on Purchase Intention for the Bundle, 33 J. BUS.
RES. 57 (1995); Michael D. Johnson et al., The Effects of Price Bundling On
Consumer Evaluations of Product Offerings, 16 INT'L J. RES. MARKETING 129
(1999); Andrea Ovans, Briefings from the Editors, Make a Bundle Bundling,
HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 18, 20 (referencing Mercer Management
study of "100 companies that use bundling as a major component of their cor-
porate strategy"); Soman & Gourville, supra note 1, at 30 ("[T]he practice of
price bundling is widespread."); Stefan Stremersch & Gerald J. Tellis, Strate-
gic Bundling of Products and Prices: A New Synthesis for Marketing, 66 J.
MARKETING 55, 55 (2002) ("Bundling is pervasive in today's markets."); Manjit
S. Yadav, How Buyers Evaluate Product Bundles: A Model of Anchoring and
Adjustment, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 342 (1994); Manjit S. Yadav & Kent B.
Monroe, How Buyers Perceive Savings in a Bundle Price: An Examination of a
Bundle's Transaction Value, 30 J. MARKETING RES. 350, 350 (1993)
("'[Blundling is ubiquitously applied in both consumer and industrial mar-
kets."' (citing Thomas Nagel, Economic Foundations for Pricing, 57 J. BUS. 3,
18 (1984))).
3. Gary Young, $519 Million Antitrust Judgment: Hill-Rom Claims Ver-
dict Will Not Stand, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at A9. After threatening to ap-
peal, Hill-Rom settled the case for $250 million. Sue Reisinger, Dueling Bed
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have recently filed several lawsuits against medical device
manufacturers that have been accused of violating antitrust
laws by granting bundled discounts to hospital buying groups. 4
The most prominent challenge to the legality of bundled dis-
counts came in LePage's Inc. v. 3M.5 The Third Circuit, sitting
en banc, condemned a bundled discount program, and upheld a
$68 million antitrust judgment against defendant 3M Corpora-
tion, even though the discounted prices 3M offered were above
its costs and therefore not predatory. 6 Not surprisingly, the en
banc decision caused quite an uproar in the business commu-
nity.7
The U.S. Supreme Court also seemed troubled by the deci-
sion. After 3M petitioned for writ of certiorari, the Court in-
vited the solicitor general to file a brief expressing the views of
the United States.8 The solicitor general did so on May 28,
2004, recommending that the Court stay its hand.9 That rec-
ommendation was not based on a belief that the Third Circuit's
opinion was legally correct; indeed, the government conceded
that the Third Circuit committed significant legal errors. 10 The
Manufacturers Find Peace in Settlement, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 2003, at
58.
4. See Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., No. CV 02-4770
MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26916 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2004) (order denying
defendant's motion for summary judgment); Complaint, Conmed Corp. v.
Johnson & Johnson, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 2003) (No. 03-CV-8800) (on
file with author); Complaint, Applied Med. Research Corp. v. Johnson & John-
son, Inc., (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 2003) (No. CV-03-1329) (on file with author).
5. 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932
(2004).
6. Id. at 147. In general, a seller's prices are "predatory" only if they are
set below its costs. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
7. See Mike Meyers, One Big, Sticky Mess, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Nov. 10, 2003, at D1 ("[C]ompanies nationwide are glued to the case."). The
following businesses and trade groups (represented by, among other well-
known attorneys, Kenneth Starr, Robert Bork, and A. Douglas Melamed, for-
mer head of the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division) joined amicus
briefs asking the Supreme Court to reverse the decision: BellSouth Corp.; Boe-
ing Co.; Brunswick Corp.; the Business Roundtable; Caterpillar Inc.; the Coca-
Cola Co.; Eastman Kodak Co.; Honeywell International Inc.; Hormel Foods
Corp.; Intel Corp.; Johnson & Johnson, Inc.; Kimberly-Clark Corp.; Morgan
Stanley; the National Association of Manufacturers; Nokia Inc.; Northwest
Airlines, Inc.; the Procter & Gamble Co.; Schering-Plough Corp.; Staples, Inc.;
Verizon Communications; and Xerox Corp.
8. 3M v. LePage's Inc., 540 U.S. 807 (2003).
9. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, 3M v. LePage's Inc., 124
S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (No. 02-1865), available at 2004 WL 1205191.
10. Id. at 14 n.11 ('The Third Circuit declined to apply Brooke Group pri-
marily because it thought that 'nothing in the decision suggests that its dis-
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recommendation was instead based on the government's view
that both the case law and the academic commentary on bun-
dled discounts are underdeveloped and would therefore provide
the Court little assistance in determining whether, and under
what circumstances, bundled discounts should be illegal.11 The
government observed that "[a]lthough there are references to
bundled rebates in the scholarly literature, the theoretical and
empirical analysis of that practice as a potentially exclusionary
mechanism is relatively recent and sparse," 12 and it concluded
that "the Court would be well served to await further develop-
ment of the case law, and further insights from academic com-
mentary, before attempting to devise a standard to govern
[this] important business practice of currently uncertain exclu-
sionary effect."'13 The Court was apparently persuaded. On
June 30, 2004, it denied 3M's petition for writ of certiorari. 14
This Article aims to address, in part, the scholarship deficit
noted in the government's LePage's brief. The Article analyzes
the various frameworks courts and commentators have pro-
posed for evaluating the legality of bundled discounts, and it
posits an alternative evaluative approach. Recognizing that a
bundled discount that results in an above-cost price for the
bundle (an "above-cost bundled discount")15 could, in some cir-
cussion of the [price-cost test] is applicable to a monopolist with its uncon-
strained market power.' But this Court's language plainly applies to a mo-
nopolist." (citation omitted)). See generally Supplemental Brief for Petitioner
at 2-3, LePage's Inc. (No. 02-1865), available at 2004 WL 1283785 (catalogu-
ing four errors government's brief identified in Third Circuit's opinion).
11. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12 n.9, LePage's Inc.
(No. 02-1865) (noting that "[tihe practice of bundled rebates has received far
less judicial and scholarly scrutiny than predatory pricing," that "[o]nly two
other litigated cases ... have squarely focused on such practices" (citations
omitted)); id. at 14 ("There is insufficient experience with bundled discounts to
this point to make a firm judgment about the relative prevalence of exclusion-
ary versus procompetitive bundled discounts."); id. at 18 ("[T]he meager case
law addressing bundled rebates offers little assistance in determining how al-
ternative standards might work in practice."); id. at 19 ("[A]t this juncture, it
would be preferable to allow the case law and economic analysis to develop
further and to await a case with a record better adapted to development of an
appropriate standard.").
12. Id. at 12 n.9.
13. Id. at 15-16.
14. 3M v. LePage's Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004).
15. The term "above-cost bundled discount" is ambiguous. It might signify
that the price of the bundle exceeds the bundle's cost (i.e., the sum of the costs
of the products within the bundle). See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 749(a), at 509-12 (2d ed. 2002) (describing
this sort of "above-cost" bundled discount). Alternatively, the term could de-
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cumstances, cause anticompetitive harm, the proposed ap-
proach rejects the view that such a discount should be per se
legal. At the same time, the approach accounts for the fact that
bundled discounts result in lower consumer prices and thus
generally should be permitted. The proposed framework at-
tempts to provide an easily administrable legal rule for sepa-
rating the procompetitive "wheat" from the anticompetitive
"chaff."
Part I of the Article clarifies what bundled discounts are
and sets forth the primary anticompetitive concern such dis-
counts raise. In particular, Part I demonstrates how bundled
discounts-unlike discounts conditioned upon purchasing a
specified quantity of a single product-may injure competition
by excluding rivals that are as efficient as the discounter.
Part II then considers and critiques five approaches courts
and commentators have proposed for determining the legality
of above-cost bundled discounts. 16 One proposed approach
would deem such discounts per se legal. Part II.A rejects that
approach because it fails to adequately account for the ability of
above-cost bundled discounts to exclude equally efficient rivals.
Part II.B considers and rejects an approach that would ban
bundled discounts that unjustifiably raised rivals' costs, for
procompetitive conduct frequently raises rivals' costs, and the
approach would likely thwart much procompetitive, consumer-
friendly discounting. Part II.C critiques the approach employed
by the LePage's majority, which focused on the breadth of the
discounter's product line vis-A-vis that of its competitors. That
approach may force consumers to forego lower prices to protect
less efficient rivals and will discourage even procompetitive
bundled discounting by forcing discounters to justify their re-
duced prices by pointing to adequate cost savings. Part II.D
considers an approach that would require a plaintiff to prove
that it is an equally efficient rival but would be excluded by the
bundled discount at issue. That approach would create intrac-
table administration difficulties and would likely result in
scribe a bundle where each product within the bundle is priced above cost,
even after the entire amount of the discount is attributed to that single prod-
uct. See Crane, supra note 1, at 29. This Article uses the term in the former
sense: a bundled discount is "above cost" if the discounted price of the bundle
exceeds the sum of the costs of the products within the bundle. Bundled dis-
counts where the price of each product is above cost even after the entire
amount of the discount is attributed to that product should be per se legal, for
the reasons stated by Professor Crane. See id. at 30-48.
16. See supra note 15.
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suboptimal deterrence of truly exclusionary bundled discount-
ing. Finally, Part II.E criticizes the approach proposed by the
leading antitrust treatise because it would preclude discount
cross-subsidization, which frequently reflects vigorous competi-
tion and benefits consumers.
Having rejected the evaluative approaches that have been
suggested thus far, the Article proceeds, in Part III, to outline
an alternative approach for evaluating above-cost bundled dis-
counts. The proposed approach would presume the legality of
the discounts, but would permit plaintiffs to rebut that pre-
sumption by proving easily ascertainable facts that would en-
sure that competitive options had been exhausted and would
demonstrate that the discount could exclude a rival that was,
or was likely to become, at least as efficient as the discounter.
Specifically, the plaintiff would have to show that it could not
stay in business by lowering its price(s) on the competitive
product(s), entering new markets to create its own bundle, col-
laborating with other sellers to offer a competitive bundled dis-
count, or becoming a supplier to the discounter. If the plaintiff
made such a showing, the discounter could still avoid liability
by proving that it rejected the plaintiff's supply offer because
the offer simply was not good enough (i.e., because the plaintiff
could not produce the competitive product as efficiently as the
discounter).
I. WHAT ARE BUNDLED DISCOUNTS, AND WHY ARE
THEY TROUBLING?
Bundled discounts come in a variety of forms. The simplest
form is the "package discount," in which a seller charges a
lower price for a group of disparate goods sold together than for
the same collection of goods purchased separately. 17 A more
complicated form of bundled discount occurs when a seller
charges a lower price on all its products, or pays a rebate on all
of a buyer's purchases from it, if the buyer meets certain pur-
chase targets in multiple product lines measured by volume,
dollar value, or percentage of the buyer's requirements. This
was the sort of bundled discount at issue in LePage's, where de-
fendant 3M offered sizable discounts on all purchases from it,
17. For example, a manufacturer of shampoo and conditioner might
charge $2.00 per bottle of shampoo and $4.00 per bottle of conditioner, but
might sell the two products together for $5.00. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc.
v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also infra
notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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but only if buyers met purchase targets in several of 3M's var-
ied product lines.18 It is also the sort of bundled discount that is
currently creating antitrust problems for manufacturers of
medical devices. 19 The defining characteristic of bundled dis-
counts is that they are multi-product, purchase target dis-
counts-they are conditioned upon purchasing some quantum
of goods from multiple product markets.
The term "bundled discount" therefore excludes straight-
forward volume discounts, what might be termed "single-
product purchase target discounts," pursuant to which a seller
offers a reduced price or pays a rebate on all purchases of a sin-
gle product as long as the buyer purchases a certain quantity
from the seller.20 From a competitive standpoint, what distin-
guishes the two types of discounts is their ability to exclude ri-
vals that are at least as efficient as the discounter. 21 An above-
cost single-product volume discount may always be matched by
an equally efficient competitor, for if the discounter's final
prices are profitable (i.e., above cost), then any equally or more
18. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004). The bundled discounts at issue in LePage's
are discussed in detail below. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
19. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-998T, GROUP PURCHASING
ORGANIZATIONS 13-14 (2003); see supra note 4 (citing case materials in which
this sort of bundled discount is being challenged).
20. That sort of discount was at issue in Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick
Corp., in which the Eighth Circuit held that Brunswick, a manufacturer of
boat motors, did not monopolize the market for inboard and stern driven boat
motors by giving boat builders discounts pegged to their purchases of mini-
mum percentages of their requirements. 207 F.3d 1039 (8th Cir. 2000).
Brunswick offered discounts of approximately 3% off the price to boat builders
who purchased at least 70% of their motor needs from Brunswick. Id. at 1044.
It also gave an additional 1% or 2% discount to builders that agreed to main-
tain those shares for two or three years. Id. While the discounted prices were
above Brunswick's cost, the plaintiffs, a group of boat dealers, claimed that the
market share discounts had allowed Brunswick to dominate the market. Id. at
1045-46. The Eighth Circuit held that Brunswick's above-cost market share
discounts did not violate the antitrust laws. Id. at 1062-63. Noting that above-
cost discounts enjoy a "strong presumption" of legality, the court distinguished
the practices at hand from discounts conditioned on purchases of a bundle of
different products. Id. at 1061-62. Thus, the court recognized that single-
product volume discounts and bundled discounts are different competitive
animals. Id.
21. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW (Supp.
2003) 749, at 84 [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2003] (noting
that "multi-product discounts... are typically quite distinguishable from sin-
gle-product discounts or rebates" because "[a]ssuming that the fully dis-
counted price on a single product is profitable to the defendant, an equally ef-
ficient rival should always be able to match it").
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efficient rival could offer the same price and remain in busi-
ness. 22 Any competitor that would be driven from the market
by a rival's single-product volume discount, then, must be a less
efficient producer than its discounting rival.23 The same is not
true, though, for bundled discounts, which are conditioned on a
buyer's purchases of products from different markets. The con-
ventional view is that a bundled (multi-product) discount,
unlike a single-product volume discount, may exclude more ef-
ficient rivals that do not produce as broad a product line as the
discounter.24
22. See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
768(b)(2), at 149 (2d ed. 2002) ("For single-item discounts, no matter how
measured or aggregated, injury to an equally efficient rival seems implausi-
ble.").
23. As discussed below, a number of commentators have noted that single-
product volume discounts may be anticompetitive, even if they cannot exclude
equally efficient rivals, because they may cause a rival to be less efficient than
the discounter by denying the rival economies of scale. See infra notes 71-85
and accompanying text; see also Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W.
Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incen-
tives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 615, 627-30 (2000); Einer El-
hauge, The Exclusion of Competition for Hospital Sales Through Group Pur-
chasing Organizations 18 (June 25, 2002), at http://www.law.harvard.edul
faculty/elhauge/pdf/gpo-reportjune_02.pdf ("By denying rivals access to the
market share they would need to achieve their minimum efficient scale, exclu-
sionary agreements can thus raise rivals' costs."); id. at 24 n.68 ("Professor
Hovenkamp argues that an equally efficient rival can always match the [sin-
gle-product purchase target] discount ... but this is not true if ... economies
of scale exist because the exclusionary scheme will restrict the market share of
the rival and thus deprive it of the economies of scale it needs to match the
discounted price.").
24. See, e.g., LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) ("The principle anticompetitive ef-
fect of bundled rebates ... is that when offered by a monopolist they may fore-
close portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufac-
ture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a
comparable offer."); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1062
(3d Cir. 1978) (holding that defendant's bundled discount on pharmaceutical
products violated the Sherman Act because plaintiff, which sold a narrower
product line, would have to match total dollar value of discount on a much
smaller collection of products); Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining how above-cost bun-
dled discounts may exclude more efficient rivals); AREEDA & HOVENKAMP
SUPP. 2003, supra note 21, 749, at 83-84 (distinguishing single-product from
multi-product purchase target discounts because as long as the former is
above cost "an equally efficient rival should always be able to match it," but
with multi-product discounts, "even an equally efficient rival may find it im-
possible to compensate for lost discounts on products that it does not pro-
duce").
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To understand how this may occur, consider a manufac-
turer (A) that sells both shampoo and conditioner and competes
against another manufacturer (B) that sells only shampoo.25 B
is the more efficient shampoo manufacturer; it can produce
shampoo for $1.25, while it costs A $1.50 to do so. A's cost of
producing conditioner is $2.50. If sold separately, A charges
$2.00 for shampoo and $4.00 for conditioner, a total of $6.00,
but if a consumer purchases both shampoo and conditioner, A
will sell the combination for $5.00. That amount is $1.00 less
than the price charged if the products were purchased sepa-
rately but $1.00 greater than A's cost for the two products.
Thus, the following situation is presented: 26
Manufacturer A Manufacturer B
Shampoo Conditioner Shampoo
Marginal $1.50 $2.50 $1.25Cost$15$25$15
Separate
Price $2.00 $4.00 $2.00
No package
available. ToPackage $5.00 ($1.00 > A's cost) remain competitive,
Price shampoo price
must be_ $1.00.
Under these circumstances, B could stay in the market
only if it charged no more than $1.00 for shampoo (so that a
consumer's total price of B's shampoo and A's conditioner would
not exceed $5.00, A's package price). Of course, B could not do
so, given that its marginal cost is $1.25. Thus, the conventional
view asserts, A's pricing strategy would eliminate B as a com-
petitor even though B is the more efficient producer and even
25. This example is based on a hypothetical discussed in Ortho Diagnostic
Sys., Inc., 920 F. Supp. at 467.
26. This example may appear unrealistic, for it is unclear why manufac-
turer A would persist in producing shampoo when it could presumably negoti-
ate a favorable supply agreement in which manufacturer B would supply A
with shampoo for some price greater than B's cost of $1.25 per bottle but less
than A's cost of $2.00 per bottle. The parties' ignorance of their relative effi-
ciencies might account for such a situation. Regardless of its plausibility, the
example is presented because it is very similar to an example presented in the
case law. See Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 920 F. Supp. at 467.
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though A charges a price greater than the marginal cost of its
shampoo/conditioner combination. 27
The courts that have considered the legality of bundled
discounts have recognized that the primary anticompetitive
concern they present is that a monopolist who sells in multiple
product markets will use the discounts to exclude equally effi-
cient rivals who do not sell as broad a line of products (and thus
have fewer products on which to give up margin). So, for exam-
ple, the court in SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co.28 con-
demned a bundled discount offered by defendant Eli Lilly be-
cause the bundle included products not sold by plaintiff
SmithKline, which could not compete without offering huge
(and presumably below-cost) discounts on its narrower product
line.29 Similarly, the LePage's court reasoned that plaintiff
27. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw 749,
at 179 (Supp. 2004) [hereinafter AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SuPP. 2004] offers a
more complicated example of how an above-cost multi-product purchase target
discount could exclude a rival that was more efficient than the discounter:
[S]uppose a dominant firm offered products A, B, and C while a
smaller rival sold only product A', which is a substitute for A. If the
dominant firm offered any type of above-cost discount on A alone,
whether measured by quantity or share of purchases, an equally effi-
cient producer of A' would be able to match it. But if the dominant
firm carefully tailored a discount program aggregated across its three
products, this might not be the case. For example, suppose a particu-
lar buyer used equal values of A, B, and C and that a progressive dis-
count aggregated over a year went up by one point for all three prod-
ucts for each additional 1000 units of A, B, or C that the buyer took.
The purchaser that took 20,000 units of each product would get the
maximum 20 percent discount on all three; but if it took only 10,000
units of A, then its discount on A, B, and C would each drop to 10 per-
cent. An equally efficient supplier of A' might wish to compete away
10,000 units of the buyer's A purchases and could do so as long as the
dominant firm's fully discounted A price was above cost. But if the re-
tailer made this choice it would also lose 10 percentage points of the
discount on B and C. As a result, the smaller but equally efficient
firm would have to offset the buyer's loss of 10 percent on the A prod-
uct with a 30 percent discount in order to compensate the buyer for
its total loss aggregated across all three products.
Id.
28. 575 F.2d 1056.
29. Defendant Eli Lilly had, among others, two cephalosporin products,
Keflin and Keflex, on which it faced no competition, and one product, Kefzol,
on which it faced competition from plaintiff SmithKline's product, Ancef. Id. at
1059. Lilly offered a higher rebate of 3% to companies that purchased specified
quantities of any three of Lilly's cephalosporin products-an offer that, practi-
cally speaking, required combined purchases of Kefzol, Keflin, and Keflex. Id.
at 1060-62. Although hospitals were free to purchase SmithKline's Ancef with
their orders of Keflin and Keflex from Lilly, the practical effect of that decision
would be to deny the Ancef purchaser the 3% bonus rebate on all its cepha-
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LePage's could not compete with defendant 3M's bundled dis-
counts, which incorporated up to six product lines, without
drastically discounting the one product (transparent tape) it
sold in competition with 3M.30 And in Ortho Diagnostic Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.,31 the court recognized
the theoretical possibility that the plaintiff might be a more ef-
ficient rival than the defendant discounter but might neverthe-
less be driven from the market by the defendant's bundled dis-
count, which rewarded purchasers with discounts on products
the plaintiff did not sell.32
The fact that bundled discounts may make it difficult for
less diversified rivals to compete should not warrant their
automatic condemnation, however. After all, bundled discounts
are, first and foremost, discounts. They always benefit consum-
ers in the short term.33 Any legal rule that condemned bundled
discounts without a showing that they would exclude rivals
losporin products. Id. at 1061-62. The court reasoned that Lilly's arrangement
would force SmithKline to pay rebates on one product equal to rebates paid by
Lilly based on sales volume of three products. Id. at 1062. Because of Lilly's
volume advantage, to offer a rebate of the same net dollar amount as Lilly's,
SmithKline would have had to offer companies large rebates, ranging from
16% for average size hospitals to 35% for larger volume hospitals, for their
purchase of Ancef. Id. This presumably would have forced SmithKline to price
below its costs.
30. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004), is discussed extensively below. See infra notes 118-37
and accompanying text.
31. 920 F. Supp. 455.
32. Plaintiff Ortho manufactured three blood tests that competed with
three of five blood tests manufactured by defendant Abbott. Id. at 459. Abbott
provided a discount on all of a purchaser's blood test purchases if the pur-
chaser would buy at least four types of tests from Abbott, and it offered a
higher discount to purchasers who purchased all five of its tests. Id. at 460.
Ortho complained that the discount policy unfairly disadvantaged it because it
could compete with Abbott only by offering the full value of Abbott's five-
product discount on its own three-product selection. See id. at 461-62. While
recognizing that Ortho could have been excluded from the market by Abbott's
bundled discounts, even if Ortho were the more efficient competitor, the court
refused to hold Abbott liable because Ortho did not demonstrate that Abbott
was pricing its package of products below cost or that Ortho was as efficient a
producer as Abbott but was unable to compete because of the discounting
strategy. Id. at 469. Ortho Diagnostic and the test articulated therein are dis-
cussed in detail below. See infra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
33. Professor Einer Elhauge argues that any bundled discount could re-
flect an "unbundled penalty," so that the purported "discounting" scheme does
not actually benefit consumers. See infra note 263 and accompanying text. As
explained below, the sort of phony discount Professor Elhauge envisions could
be rather easily distinguished from a genuine bundled discount. See infra
notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
BUNDLED DISCOUNTS
that were, or were likely to become, as efficient as the dis-
counter would likely harm consumers by chilling all sorts of
procompetitive discounts. What courts need, then, is an evalua-
tive approach that will accurately identify anticompetitive
bundled discounts without creating the sort of legal uncertainty
(or risk of false positives) that causes understandably cautious
firms, fearful of an inappropriately rendered treble damages
award, from being overly conservative with respect to their dis-
counting practices.34 The remainder of this Article criticizes the
attempts that have been made to construct an approach for
evaluating bundled discounts and proposes an alternative
evaluative approach.
II. COMPETING EVALUATIVE APPROACHES
As the government noted in its amicus brief urging the Su-
preme Court to deny certiorari in LePage's, the issue of how to
evaluate bundled discounts has received scant attention in the
case law and scholarly literature. 35 The few courts and com-
mentators that have directly addressed the issue have dis-
agreed as to the showing a plaintiff must make to establish a
monopolization claim based on bundled discounts. 36 So far, five
34. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 749, at 183
("The difficult question [with regard to bundled discounts] is the formulation
of an administrable rule that does not overreach and condemn competitive
conduct.").
35. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12 n.9, 3M v. LePage's
Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (No. 02-1865), available at 2004 WL 1205191; see
supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
36. The case law has so far analyzed bundled discounts as potential mo-
nopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d
1056, 1062 (3d Cir. 1978); Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 920 F. Supp. at 465;
Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26916 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2004). Because bundled discounts
generally involve contracts between buyers and sellers, they might also be
deemed to violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, which precludes
concerted activity that unreasonably restrains trade. Regardless of the par-
ticular statutory provision invoked, however, the competitive analysis is likely
to be the same. A plaintiff bringing a monopolization action would have to
show that the discount amounts to anticompetitive conduct, rather than
merely vigorous competition, see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
570-71 (1966), while a section 1 plaintiff would have to show that the ar-
rangement "unreasonably" restrains trade, see Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). In either case, the determinative ques-
tion will be whether the discount ultimately enhances or diminishes competi-
tion, and the evaluative approach proposed herein could address that question
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basic approaches have emerged, ranging in terms of restric-
tiveness from a rule that would deem bundled discounts per se
legal as long as they result in above-cost pricing,3 7 to a rule
that would condemn even single-product (i.e., unbundled)
above-cost discounts if they would unjustifiably prevent com-
petitors from achieving productive efficiencies. 38 Between these
poles is an approach focused on the relative breadth of the par-
ties' product lines, 39 and two approaches that would focus on
the relative efficiency of the parties and would attempt to con-
demn only those bundled discounts that could exclude equally
or more efficient rivals.40 Examined closely, each of these five
approaches proves inadequate.
A. PER SE LEGALITY
The least restrictive approach to bundled discounts would
deem them per se legal as long as the discounted price of the
bundle exceeds the aggregate cost of the constituent products. 41
This is the approach urged by amici that filed briefs in support
of the LePage's defendant's petition for writ of certiorari. 42 Ad-
regardless of whether it was presented in a monopolization claim or as part of
a section 1 action.
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. See infra Part II.B.
39. See infra Part II.C.
40. See infra Part II.D-E.
41. A less controversial position, with which the author agrees, is that
bundled discounts should be per se legal when each product within the bundle
is priced above its cost after the entire amount of the discount is attributed to
that product. See Crane, supra note 1, at 42-43. The focus of this Article is the
more perplexing issue of how to evaluate bundled discounts that are above
cost, in the sense that the discounted price of the bundle exceeds the aggregate
cost of the products within the bundle, see supra note 15, but do not satisfy the
condition that each constituent product is priced above cost when discounted
by the entire amount of the total discount.
42. See Brief for Amici Curiae Morgan Stanley et al. at 5, 3M v. LePage's
Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (No. 02-1865), available at 2003 WL 22428378
("This Court has repeatedly recognized that low prices benefit consumers re-
gardless of how those prices are -set and that above-cost prices do not threaten
competition regardless of the type of antitrust claim involved." (internal quo-
tations, alterations, and citations omitted)); id. at 6-7 ("[D]epriving consumers
of the immediate benefits of an above-cost price cut is not sound antitrust pol-
icy .... As long as the price remains above cost, an equally efficient competi-
tor can match the discount and compete with the defendant to the benefit of
consumers." (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted)); Brief for
Amicus Curiae the Business Roundtable at 6, LePage's Inc. (No. 02-1865),
available at 2003 WL 22428382 ("This Court, in an unbroken line of cases, has
made clear that businesses are entitled-indeed, encouraged-to engage in
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vocates of this per se legality approach maintain that it is com-
pelled by Supreme Court precedent and is desirable as a policy
matter.
In support of their claim that Supreme Court precedent
mandates the per se legality approach, advocates cite a line of
decisions culminating in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp.,43 in which the Court broadly suggested
that discounts are legal unless they result in below-cost
prices. 44 In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.,45 for example, the Court recognized a danger in inferring
exclusionary conduct from price cuts aimed at forcing competi-
tors from the market or deterring new entrants. 46 "[C]utting
prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of
competition," the Court explained, and the potential for "mis-
taken inferences" of exclusionary conduct may therefore "chill
the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect."
47
While the Court declined to address the issue of whether exclu-
sionary conduct could ever result from above-cost discounted
prices,48 it did indicate that predatory pricing claims generally
require "pricing below some appropriate measure of cost."
49
Similarly, in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc.,50 the Court noted
that it would be a "perverse result"51 if the antitrust laws were
above-cost price-cutting without fear that those pro-competitive actions will
subject them to antitrust liability."); id. at 16 ("[E]ven if there were a rare in-
stance in which a price cut would be anticompetitive, courts must always err
on the side of no liability."); Brief for the Boeing Company et al., as Amici Cu-
riae at 13, LePage's Inc. (No. 02-1865), available at 2003 WL 22428377
("[A]bove-cost pricing practices challenged in any antitrust claim are entitled
to an absolute safe harbor .. ") (internal quotation omitted); Brief of Wash-
ington Legal Foundation and National Association of Manufacturers as Amici
Curiae at 19, LePage's Inc. (No. 02-1865), available at 2003 WL 22428379 (en-
couraging the Court to recognize "a safe harbor for all above-cost price compe-
tition, thereby providing producers with clear guidance regarding how to com-
pete without running afoul of the antitrust laws").
43. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
44. See id. at 222-23. None of the Supreme Court precedents cited by per
se legality advocates addressed multi-product discounts, so the persuasiveness
of their broad dicta addressing discounts in general is debatable.
45. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
46. See id. at 594.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 585 n.9.
49. Id. at 584-85 n.8. As to what "some appropriate measure of cost"
means, see infra note 61.
50. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
51. Id. at 116.
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construed to preclude price cuts aimed at increasing market
share, "for '[i]t is in the interest of competition to permit domi-
nant firms to engage in vigorous competition, including price
competition."' 52 And in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum
Co., 53 the Court reiterated the view that low but above-cost
pricing could not give rise to the sort of injury the antitrust
laws were designed to preclude. 54 Concluding that "in the con-
text of pricing practices, only predatory pricing has the requi-
site anticompetitive effect,"55 the Court observed (albeit in a
discussion of single-product discounting) that discounted but
above-cost prices cannot be anticompetitive "regardless of how
those prices are set."56
The Court's most direct statement of the rule that dis-
counts must be below cost to create antitrust liability occurred
in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.57
The matter before the Court in that case was the legality of de-
52. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v.
S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir. 1984)). The issue in Cargill
was whether the plaintiff had adequately alleged antitrust injury in challeng-
ing a potential merger on the grounds that the new entity would 'lower its
prices to some level at or slightly above its costs in order to compete... for
market share," thereby cutting into plaintiff's profits. Id. at 114. While the
Court recognized that a claim based on below-cost pricing could give rise to
antitrust injury, it held that plaintiff had waived any such claim and was in-
stead complaining of above-cost, but discounted, prices, which could not give
rise to antitrust injury. Id. at 117-22.
53. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
54. Holding that a competitor cannot suffer antitrust injury from a verti-
cal price-fixing scheme that sets prices above costs, the Court explained:
When a firm, or even a group of firms adhering to a vertical agree-
ment, lowers prices but maintains them above predatory levels, the
business lost by rivals cannot be viewed as an "anticompetitive" con-
sequence of the claimed violation. A firm complaining of the harm it
suffers from nonpredatory price competition "is really claiming that it[is] unable to raise prices." This is not antitrust injury; indeed, "cut-
ting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of
competition."
Id. at 337-38 (alteration in original) (footnote and citations omitted). The
Court explained that antitrust injury must arise from an anticompetitive as-
pect of the defendant's behavior. See id. at 339. The Court concluded that dis-
counted prices cannot be anticompetitive unless they are below-cost because
above-cost pricing cannot exclude equally or more efficient rivals who could
always stay in business by lowering their prices below supracompetitive lev-
els. See id. at 337-38 n.7 ("Rivals cannot be excluded in the long run by a non-
predatory maximum-price scheme unless they are relatively inefficient.").
55. Id. at 339.
56. Id. at 340.
57. 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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fendant Brown & Williamson's sharp rebates on purchases of
its generic cigarettes.58 Before dissecting the details of the
plaintiff's complicated theory of predation (and holding that the
plaintiff had failed to establish harm to competition),59 the
Court addressed generally the subject of predatory pricing. Not-
ing that some of its prior opinions had reserved the question of
"whether recovery should ever be available... when the pricing
in question is above some measure of incremental cost,"60 the
Court decided to put that question to rest once and for all. It
stated unequivocally that "a plaintiff seeking to establish com-
petitive injury resulting from a rival's low prices must prove
that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure
of its rival's costs."6 1 Above-cost discounting, the Court insisted,
"is beyond the practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control
without courting intolerable risks of chilling legitimate price-
cutting."62 Thus, the Court established a bright-line rule that
courts should not entertain antitrust claims based on low prices
(of a single product, at least), unless those prices are below the
discounter's cost and could therefore drive out of business those
firms that are as efficient as the discounter but do not possess
the financial reserves necessary to sustain below-cost pricing.
As noted, Brooke Group and its progenitors addressed only
single-product discounting. 63 Nevertheless, the per se legality
advocates maintain that extending Brooke Group's below-cost
criterion to bundled discounts represents sound antitrust policy
because any attempt to condemn some above-cost bundled dis-
counts (those that could exclude equally efficient competitors)
would involve a measure of uncertainty that would discourage
proconsumer, nonexclusionary discounts. 64 Such a perverse re-
58. See id. at 230-31 (summarizing Liggett's theory of predation).
59. See id. at 230.
60. Id. at 223 (alteration in original) (quoting Cargill Inc. v. Monfort, Inc.,
479 U.S. 104, 117-18 n.12 (1996)).
61. Id. at 222. The Supreme Court has never precisely addressed what
constitutes "an appropriate measure" of a discounter's costs-that is, whether
the proper metric is marginal cost, average variable cost, or some other meas-
ure. Commentators are split on this issue and the matter is beyond the pur-
view of this Article. See generally Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to
Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory-And the Implications for Defining
Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 704-07 (2003) (describing "the
murky and divided nature of the current debate over cost definitions").
62. Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 223.
63. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
64. Brief for Amici Curiae BellSouth Corp. et al. at 6, 3M v. LePage's Inc.,
124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (No. 02-1865), available at 2003 WL 22428381 ("[T]he
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sult is likely, per se legality advocates argue, because the anti-
trust laws provide for treble damages,65 and antitrust tribunals
are largely incapable of making the fine economic distinctions
necessary to distinguish anticompetitive from procompetitive
conduct. 66 Rather than risk a potential judgment requiring
payment of treble damages, firms would be reluctant to offer
discounts involving multiple products, even where those dis-
counts were not at all exclusionary. 6 7 The possibility of exclu-
sionary bundled discounting schemes does not trouble per se
legality advocates. After all, Brooke Group's safe harbor for
above-cost pricing is based not on some theory that above-cost
discounted pricing can never be anticompetitive.6 8 Rather, the
need for easily administered rules is particularly acute in this context because
bundled pricing policies are characterized by fast-paced, trial-and-error ex-
perimentation, and firms cannot easily apply an indeterminate, multi-factor
antitrust analysis every time they tweak a pricing policy to accommodate rap-
idly shifting market realities." (footnote omitted)).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000) (permitting antitrust plaintiff to recover
"threefold the damages by him sustained").
66. As then Judge (now Justice) Stephen Breyer explained:
[U]nlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of
which depend upon the content of rules and precedents only as they
are applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising
their clients. Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity
and qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration,
prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they
seek to serve.
Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983).
67. The Business Roundtable recognized this point in its brief in support
of defendant's petition for writ of certiorari in the LePage's case:
Rather than take the risk that a jury might condemn such practices
with treble damages, and rather than hire a cadre of lawyers and
economic consultants to attempt to justify every new proposed pricing
scheme, firms will simply choose not to grant such discounts, and not
to bundle products, at all. The result will be higher prices and eco-
nomic inefficiencies, to the consumer's ultimate detriment-precisely
what antitrust laws seek to avoid.
Brief for Amicus Curiae the Business Roundtable at 14, LePage's Inc. (No. 02-
1865), available at 2003 WL 22428382.
68. An abundance of relatively noncontroversial economic scholarship
shows that strategic single-product pricing can be anticompetitive even at
prices above cost. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review
and Critique, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 257, 312 (summarizing literature re-
garding possible anticompetitive effects of above-cost but discounted pricing).
For example, businesses may use above-cost discounts to discourage entry, ei-
ther by engaging in "limit" pricing or by building excess capacity and holding
out the threat of dramatic price reductions. Id. (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980) (final order)); F. M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 356-66, 405-
06 (3d ed. 1990); Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Wel-
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safe harbor is based on the ground that any consumer benefit
created by a rule that permits inquiry into above-cost, single-
product discounts, but allows judicial condemnation of those
deemed legitimately exclusionary, would likely be outweighed
by the consumer harm occasioned by overdeterring nonexclu-
sionary discounts. 69 Similarly, per se legality advocates warn, a
legal rule that permits judicial condemnation of some above-
cost bundled discounts would likely cause more harm than
good.
In essence, per se legality advocates contend that the total
costs of a rule restricting some bundled discounts (the adminis-
trative costs of the rule plus the costs resulting from wrong de-
cisions and from deterrence of procompetitive behavior) would
exceed the total benefits of such a rule (the benefits resulting
from elimination of anticompetitive bundled discounts). But
that claim assumes either (1) that above-cost bundled discounts
are so unlikely to exclude equally or more efficient competitors
that the search for exclusionary bundled discounts is not worth
the effort, or (2) that there is no alternative evaluative ap-
proach that is easily administrable and is unlikely to overdeter
proconsumer discounts. Both assumptions are probably untrue.
First, as the aforementioned shampoo/conditioner example in-
dicates, it is not difficult to imagine instances of multi-product
sellers using bundled discounts to create or maintain monopoly
power by driving less diversified rivals from the market.
70
Thus, it is doubtful that exclusionary bundled discounts are so
rare that any effort to identify and condemn them is unjusti-
fied. Second, as Part III explains, there is an alternative
evaluative regime that is both easily administrable and
unlikely to overdeter proconsumer discounts and is therefore
worth adopting.
fare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284 (1977); Steven C. Salop, Strategic Entry Deter-
rence, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 335 (1979); David F. Weiman & Richard C. Levin,
Preying for Monopoly? The Case of Southern Bell Telephone Company, 1894-
1912, 102 J. POL. ECON. 103 (1994). Alternatively, businesses might set low
but above-cost prices so as to signal false information about costs, thus deter-
ring rivals who cannot meet the apparent costs of the dominant firm, see JEAN
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 367-74 (1999), or to re-
duce the cost of acquiring rivals, see Malcolm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and
the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 J. POL. ECON. 266 (1986).
69. Cf. Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 234 ("[W]e must be concerned lest a rule
or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable pric-
ing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price competition.").
70. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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B. EXCLUSIONARY IF RivALs' COSTS ARE
RAISED UNJUSTIFIABLY
1. The Approach
A second approach to bundled discounts focuses on
whether the discounts unjustifiably increase the costs of the
discounter's rivals. 71 This 'aising rivals' costs" approach lies, at
the opposite end of the spectrum from the per se legality ap-
proach, for it would go so far as to condemn certain above-cost,
single-product purchase target discounts.7 2 Advocates of this
restrictive approach reason that discounts conditioned upon
purchasing a bundle, or even a specified amount of a single
product, may foreclose marketing opportunities for the dis-
counter's rivals, thereby raising the rivals' costs by denying
them economies of scale.7 3
To see how even a single-product purchase target discount
might raise rivals' costs, 74 consider a manufacturer whose well-
established brand enjoys such an inelastic consumer demand
that retailers must carry about 60% of their requirements of
the product in that firm's brand.75 Suppose that, to achieve the
economies of scale and other efficiencies necessary to be a vi-
able producer of this product, a competing manufacturer needs
71. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56
STAN. L. REV. 253, 315 (2003) [hereinafter Elhauge, Monopolization Stan-
dards]; Tom, Balto & Averitt, supra note 23, at 636-38; Einer Elhauge, Anti-
trust Analysis of GPO Exclusionary Agreements 38-39 (Sept. 26, 2003) [here-
inafter Elhauge, GPO Agreement Analysis] (statement for DOJ-FTC Hearing
on GPOs), at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/statementftc
doj.pdf.
72. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text. The prevailing view is
that such discounts are legal, for they can always be matched by an equally
efficient competitor and will therefore tend to exclude only relatively ineffi-
cient rivals. See, e.g., Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039,
1061 (8th Cir. 2000); 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 22, 768(b)(2), at
149 ("For single-item discounts, no matter how measured or aggregated, injury
to an equally efficient rival seems implausible.").
73. See Tom, Balto & Averitt, supra note 23, at 622-27; Elhauge, GPO
Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at 3-10.
74. The following example is taken from Tom, Balto & Averitt, supra note
23, at 627-29.
75. Id. at 627. Gerber brand baby food, which commands strong brand
loyalty and is carried by almost all retailers that sell baby food, may be an ex-
ample of this sort of product. See F.T.C. v. H.J. Heinz, Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d
190, 193 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that because "Gerber enjoys unparalleled brand
recognition" and high brand loyalty, nearly all supermarkets must stock the
product), rev'd on other grounds, 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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to maintain about a 35% market share. Assume that the cur-
rent market share of the dominant brand is 60% (reflective of
consumer demand) and the competitor's share is 40%. If the
dominant firm were to offer an above-cost discount of 6% (going
back to the first purchase) to buyers purchasing at least 70% of
their requirements from the firm, such a discount could impair
the efficiency of the non-dominant competitor.76 The modest
"market share discount" could cause a major shift in purchas-
ing among retailers, for the entire dollar value of the across-
the-board 6% discount would be concentrated on the retailers'
decisions to buy the incremental units between 60% and 70% of
requirements. 77 As Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto, and Neil
W. Averitt explain, "[T]he buyer faces a 'tax' or 'penalty' in the
form of the loss of all cumulative discounts if it takes a [single]
unit from an alternative supplier beyond 30% of its needs."78
Thus, to compete with the dominant seller's 6% discount, the
rival seller would have to give a discount on its smaller market
share that was equal in absolute dollar value to the 6% dis-
count the dominant supplier would provide on 70% of the pur-
chaser's requirements. If prices were set close to marginal cost,
the nondominant seller would not be able to provide such a dis-
count, and its market share would probably fall below 30%, a
level beneath the "minimum efficient scale" of 35%.79 Thus, ad-
vocates of the restrictive approach assert any discount struc-
tured to usurp business from rivals-even an above-cost, sin-
gle-product purchase target discount-may be used to raise
rivals' costs and should therefore be subject to condemnation if
the discount is not justified.80
Professor Einer Elhauge, perhaps the leading proponent of
this restrictive approach, has identified a number of ways
above-cost purchase target discounts may raise rivals' costs.81
As the example above illustrates, purchase target discounts
that result in foreclosure may bar rivals from marketing outlets
76. See Tom, Balto & Averitt, supra note 23, at 627.
77. Id. I am assuming, of course, that retailers carry 60% of their re-
quirements in the dominant firm's brand, reflecting overall consumer demand.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. See id. at 627-28.
80. As explained below, the commentators recommending a raising rivals'
costs approach have disagreed as to how to spot a discount that raises rivals'
costs but should nonetheless be legal because it is justified. See infra notes 87-
92 and accompanying text.
81. See Elhauge, Monopolization Standards, supra note 71, at 256, 283,
320-23; Elhauge, GPO Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at 4-10.
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needed to sustain minimum efficient scale.82 Even when alter-
native marketing outlets are available, rivals' costs will be
raised (and their efficiency reduced) if those alternative means
of distribution are less cost-effective.8 3 Moreover, to the extent
marketing opportunities are foreclosed, rivals will find it more
difficult to raise capital for research and development, for capi-
tal markets will provide less funding where expected payoffs
are lower, and such payoffs will obviously be lower when avail-
able marketing opportunities are foreclosed.8 4 In addition, pur-
chase target discounts may decrease the efficiency of the dis-
counter's rivals in industries where there are "network effects"
(i.e., where the value to a consumer of a particular brand of
product increases as more consumers purchase that brand); in
such industries, discounts that take market share from rivals
82. Elhauge, Monopolization Standards, supra note 71, at 321; Elhauge,
GPO Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at 4.
In most industries, there are economies of scale at low output levels,
so that firms can lower their costs by expanding until they reach the
output level that minimizes their costs, which is called the minimum
efficient scale. If foreclosure prevents a competitive number of rivals
from maintaining this scale, or from expanding their operations to
reach it, then it impairs their efficiency.
Elhauge, Monopolization Standards, supra note 71, at 321; cf. LePage's Inc. v.
3M, 324 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("As a result [of defendant's
bundled discounts, which expanded its market share], LePage's manufactur-
ing process became less efficient and its profit margins declined. In transpar-
ent tape manufacturing, large volume customers are essential to achieving ef-
ficiencies of scale."), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004).
83. Elhauge, GPO Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at 5 ("Even if other
means of distribution remain open ... foreclosing rivals from the means of dis-
tribution that are the most cost effective will increase rival costs and thus
their prices, hampering their ability to compete." (citing HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 431 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that "fore-
closure theories of exclusive dealing become more robust if" they are "raising
rivals' costs by relegating them to inferior distribution channels"))); see El-
hauge, Monopolization Standards, supra note 71, at 321. The court in LePage's
appears to have accepted this reasoning:
In the transparent tape market, superstores like Kmart and Wal-
Mart provide a crucial facility to any manufacturer-they supply high
volume sales with the concomitant substantially reduced distribution
costs. By wielding its monopoly power in transparent tape and its
vast array of product lines, 3M foreclosed LePage's from that critical
bridge to consumers that superstores provide, namely, cheap, high
volume supply lines.
324 F.3d at 160 n.14.
84. Elhauge, Monopolization Standards, supra note 71, at 322 ("If firms
are foreclosed from a significant share of the market, then successful innova-
tions will have a smaller payoff than they otherwise would have, which will
discourage efficient investments in research and innovation.") Elhauge, GPO
Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at 7.
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impair those rivals by decreasing the value of their products to
consumers.
8 5
So what does all this theorizing imply for the law govern-
ing bundled discounts? Should the law simply preclude dis-
counts that win away market share from the discounter's ri-
vals? Surely not, for practically all discounts do that. Indeed,
Professor Elhauge acknowledges that any price-decreasing or
product-improving innovation will permit the innovator to
usurp business from rivals, and thus might have the effect of
raising rivals' costs-and he recognizes that antitrust law
should not discourage such innovations.8 6 Thus, antitrust tri-
bunals need some means of separating procompetitive from
anticompetitive bundled discounts.
Former Federal Trade Commission (FTC) officials Tom,
Balto, and Averitt, who have advocated a "raising rivals' costs"
approach, have recommended that antitrust tribunals engage
in case-by-case analysis to determine whether above-cost pur-
chase target discounts are legal.8 7 Such an approach, the for-
mer regulators contend, "would let counselors and enforcers
concentrate instead on the core questions that have long been
central to antitrust-whether the restraints at issue tend to
create or facilitate horizontal problems of collusion or exclu-
sion" and would "focus[ I on effect rather than on formalistic
line drawing."8 8 The problem with this open-ended approach, of
course, is that it offers virtually no guidance to businesses. In
practice, it would require antitrust counselors to predict
whether a judge (or, worse yet, a jury) would conclude that an
above-cost purchase target discount was merely "competition
85. Elhauge, GPO Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at 6. "Network ef-
fects" exist when a "seller's product is more valuable to buyers the more that
other buyers have purchased the same good from that seller." Id.
86. Elhauge, Monopolization Standards, supra note 71, at 265
("[P]erfectly desirable competitive behavior can 'foreclose competition' and 'de-
stroy a competitor,' such as when a firm figures out how to make a better or
cheaper product and thus takes away market sales from rivals and drives
them out of the market.").
87. Tom, Balto & Averitt, supra note 23, at 638 ('"Vhere the pricing struc-
ture, rather than the price level, is used to secure an anticompetitive result,
the cost test of predatory pricing does not automatically apply. Instead, one
must conduct a case-by-case analysis of the actual effects of the particular
practice to determine whether anticompetitive outcomes are likely."). When
their article was published, Tom, Balto, and Averitt were, respectively, the
deputy director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition, the bureau's assistant di-
rector for policy and evaluation, and an attorney within the bureau.
88. Id. at 638-39.
20051 1709
1710 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [89:1688
on the merits" or was likely to be so successful (i.e., to win so
much business from rivals) that it would harm competition by
reducing rivals' efficiencies. The crystal ball nature of this in-
quiry, coupled with the fact that a mistaken prediction could
result in treble damages, would likely overdeter by chilling
many proconsumer discounts.
Recognizing the danger inherent in a case-by-case balanc-
ing of competitive effects,8 9 Professor Elhauge has proposed a
more structured inquiry. Under his suggested approach, the
antitrust tribunal would ask whether the discounting behavior
would enhance the discounter's market power regardless of
whether it enhanced the discounter's efficiency.9 0 If so, then the
discount is anticompetitively exclusionary, and there is no need
to weigh its procompetitive benefits. 91 If not (the discounting
behavior could not enhance the discounter's market power
without creating some efficiencies for the discounter), then the
discounting behavior is procompetitive and should be deemed
legal per se, even if the discounting did cause some foreclosure
of marketing opportunities for rivals.92
Under Professor Elhauge's approach, a purchase target
discount that had the effect of decreasing the market share of
the discounter's rivals and thereby increasing their costs would
89. Under an approach that determines the legality of structured dis-
counts (or other conduct) on the basis of an open-ended, case-by-case inquiry
into whether the conduct is exclusionary,
firms must operate under the risk that the actual criteria by which
their conduct will be judged will depend largely on the happenstance
of which judge and jurors will be selected in a trial a great number of
years later that will retroactively decide whether to assess multimil-
lion or even multibillion dollar treble damages. Further, firms run the
risk that different judges or juries will reach inconsistent conclusions
about the legality of their conduct based on different implicit norma-
tive criteria. These sorts of risks cannot help but chill investments to
create product offerings with a sufficient quality or cost advantage
over preexisting market options ....
Elhauge, Monopolization Standards, supra note 71, at 266-67.
90. See id. at 315.
91. Id. at 315-16.
92. See id. Professor Elhauge maintains that antitrust law should eschew
"an open-ended rule of reason balancing test" and should instead
employ[ ] two rules to sort out when to condemn conduct that helps
acquire or maintain monopoly power. One rule makes such conduct
per se legal if its exclusionary effect on rivals depends on enhancing
the defendant's efficiency. The other rule makes such conduct per se
illegal if its exclusionary effect on rivals will enhance monopoly power
regardless of any improvement in defendant efficiency.
Id. at 330.
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be legal only if selling the product as a bundle (in the case of a
bundled discount) or in the quantities required to earn a vol-
ume discount (in the case of a single-product purchase target
discount) created efficiencies for the discounter. 93 Moreover, the
discount presumably could be no greater than required to at-
tain those efficiencies, for any incremental discount in excess of
that amount would effectively be raising rivals' costs and en-
hancing the discounter's market power "regardless of any im-
provement in [the discounter's] efficiency." 94 So, for example, a
firm with a 70% market share charging supracompetitive
prices could not offer volume discounts if all available econo-
mies of scale could be exploited at a level of production equal to
50% of the market and there were no distributional or other ef-
ficiencies created by selling the larger volume. Nor could a firm
that could obtain productive or distributional efficiencies by in-
creasing total production or the size of individual orders offer a
discount greater than that necessary to induce the increased
demand needed to achieve the growth in production or order
size. Consider, for example, a firm that currently operates its
factories at 70% capacity and could reduce its per unit costs
from $.10 per unit to $.09 per unit by running the factories at
85% capacity. Running the factories above 85% capacity, how-
ever, would produce no net efficiency gain, for any incremental
economies of scale would be offset by diseconomies occasioned
by, for example, excessive wear and tear. Suppose that the firm
could expand demand for its product sufficiently to warrant
production at 85% capacity by paying a 10% rebate on pur-
chases over 1000 units. Under Professor Elhauge's approach,
the firm would be allowed to offer that rebate, but it could not
offer a higher rebate (say, 12%) even if the post-rebate price
was well above cost. The 2% excess discount would tend to re-
duce rivals' market shares, raise their costs, and enhance the
discounter's market power regardless of whether it provided an
efficiency gain. Thus, the excess discount would be "exclusion-
ary," even if it resulted in above-cost pricing.
Put simply, Professor Elhauge's view seems to be that
bundled discounts will be deemed exclusionary if they raise ri-
vals' costs "unjustifiably," where 'Justifiable" means "as a by-
product of a gain in productive or distributional efficiency." 95
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. See id.
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Thus, in evaluating a purchase target or bundled discount, the
antitrust tribunal would ask, "Is selling the product in this
fashion somehow making the discounter more efficient, or is
the discounter merely giving up margin?" If the latter, the dis-
count would be illegal. If the former, the tribunal must ask a
follow-up question: "Could the efficiencies be achieved by giving
a smaller discount (or by structuring the discount in some other
fashion that would win less business from rivals)?" If so, the
"excess discount" (or the part of the structured discount whose
efficiency-enhancing ends could be achieved in a manner that
would raise rivals' costs less) would be anticompetitively exclu-
sionary.
2. Evaluation of the Approach
Both versions of the "raising rivals' costs" approach (both
the case-by-case approach advocated by the former FTC offi-
cials and Professor Elhauge's more focused approach) are prob-
lematic. As an initial matter, the claim that single-product pur-
chase target discounts pose the same sort of competitive threat
posed by bundled discounts is wrong. As explained above, the
majority view is that an above-cost, single-product purchase
target discount may be met by any equally efficient rival.96 Pro-
fessor Elhauge and the former FTC officials maintain that this
argument misses the point, for such discounts may actually
cause rivals to be less efficient by denying them the business
needed to achieve all available economies of scale. 97 But any po-
tentially efficient rival willing to engage in vigorous competi-
tion could maintain the market share necessary to achieve
economies of scale and thus need not be excluded by an above-
cost, single-product purchase target discount.
96. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
97. See Tom, Balto & Averitt, supra note 23, at 621-23, 636-38; Elhauge,
GPO Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at 33-34 ("[Tlhe claim that rivals can
avoid foreclosure by just matching the exclusionary discount assumes away
the very anticompetitive harm of interest. For one reason that equally efficient
rivals cannot match the discounts is that the marketwide foreclosure has im-
paired their efficiency."); Elhauge, supra note 23, at 24 n.68.
Professor Hovenkamp argues that an equally efficient rival can al-
ways match the discount.., but this is not true if... economies of
scale exist because the exclusionary scheme will restrict the market
share of the rival and thus deprive it of the economies of scale it needs
to match the discounted price.
Elhauge, supra note 23, at 24 n.68 (citations omitted).
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To see this point, consider again the situation where the
discounter has a larger market share than its rival, is able to
offer an above-cost purchase target discount, the total dollar
value of which the rival could not meet (given its smaller mar-
ket share) without pricing below cost, and is thus able to win
enough market share from the rival to prevent it from obtain-
ing all available economies of scale. 98 Professor Elhauge and
the former FTC officials assume that the rival has no way of
competing with the discounter. But a rival firm ought to be able
to raise the capital necessary to meet (or beat) the discount as
long as the rival firm (1) produces a product of equal or better
quality, and (2) could produce the product as cheaply as the
discounter after achieving all economies of scale. By raising the
capital necessary to meet (or beat) the discount, the rival firm
would be able to expand its market share.
As the old saying goes, one must spend money to make
money. Every business makes investments to achieve the mar-
ket share required to obtain minimum efficient scale. Busi-
nesses must, for example, build productive facilities of the req-
uisite size, produce marketing and advertising materials, give
away free samples to generate consumer interest, and incur all
sorts of other start-up costs. Start-ups finance these expendi-
tures, of course, by convincing investors and lenders that their
product is superior to competing products and will eventually
command enough consumer loyalty to warrant production at
the level required to attain all available economies of scale.
When they in fact have a "better mousetrap" and plausible
plans for efficiently producing that mousetrap, they should
have little trouble raising start-up funds. 99
Just as a business must incur costs early on to establish
the market share required to achieve minimum efficient scale,
it might-if its margins were not great enough to fund a com-
petitive discount-have to incur similar costs to recover market
98. Recall the example offered by the former FTC officials: A has a 60%
market share; B has a 40% market share; the market share required to attain
all available scale efficiencies is 35%; A offers a 6% discount on all purchases
conditioned on the buyer taking at least 70% of its requirements from A; B,
therefore, would have to meet that total dollar discount on its smaller (40%)
market share; B could not do this without pricing below cost and will therefore
lose enough market share to fall below minimum efficient scale. See supra
notes 74-80 and accompanying text (discussing an example presented by Tom,
Balto & Averitt, supra note 23, at 627).
99. See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 925, 929-30 (1979).
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share from a discounting rival and thereby protect or enhance
productive efficiencies. But the fact that it has to incur such
costs does not mean it is being "excluded" from the market. If
the disadvantaged rival's product was as good as the dis-
counter's and could be produced as cheaply at minimum effi-
cient scale, the rival should be able to raise enough capital to
fund any discount necessary to grow its market share to the
point necessary to achieve minimum efficient scale. 100 Its be-
low-cost pricing for the period required to achieve such a scale
would not amount to predation because there would be no like-
lihood of recoupment via supracompetitive pricing. 101 Were a
rival unable to achieve minimum efficient scale by pricing just
below the discounter's above-cost discounted price and thereby
winning business from the discounter, it would be because the
capital markets perceived the rival's product to be inferior to
the discounter's, and the rival's loss of business would thus be
deserved.10 2 Accordingly, any above-cost, single-product pur-
chase target discount should be deemed per se legal.
A second problem with the "raising rivals' costs" position is
that its adherents have failed to articulate a workable means of
separating procompetitive from anticompetitive discounts. As
noted above, and as recognized by Professor Elhauge, an
evaluative approach involving an open-ended, case-by-case bal-
ancing of competitive effects is undesirable because it offers lit-
tle guidance for businesses, subjects them to the possibility of
100. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW 421(b), at 67 (2d
ed. 2002) ("If capital markets are working well, new investment will be made
in any market earning anything above competitive returns-a term defined to
include sufficient profit to attract new capital-regardless of the absolute cost
of entry."); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-69
(1968); Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 49-53
(1982); Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Pol-
icy, 16 J. L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1973). But see Richard R. Nelson, Comments on a
Paper by Posner, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 949, 950 (1979) ("The Chicago proposition
that scale economies don't serve as a barrier to entry hinges on explicit or im-
plicit assumptions about perfect capital markets and no adjustment lags or
costs.").
101. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993) (positing the likelihood of recoupment via future mo-
nopoly pricing as prerequisite to a valid predation claim).
102. The point here is that any equally efficient-or potentially equally ef-
ficient-rival could procure the financing necessary to temporarily price below
cost to win market share from the discounter and achieve economies of scale.
"Expenditures" on a period of below-cost pricing to win market share are just
like an investment in a factory, research and development, introductory mar-
keting materials, or other start-up costs.
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inappropriate treble damages judgments, and is therefore
likely to overdeter proconsumer bundled discounts. 103 But what
about Professor Elhauge's more focused approach? That ap-
proach is similarly deficient for at least three reasons.
First, the approach, which would "make[ ] [any] conduct
per se illegal if its exclusionary effect on rivals will enhance
monopoly power regardless of any improvement in defendant
efficiency," 10 4 would have the perverse effect of preventing price
cutting by any monopolist that had achieved all available
economies of scale and was unable to achieve additional distri-
butional efficiencies by discounting. Consider, for example, a
widget monopolist that commands a 70% market share and
sells widgets for $2.00, a 100% markup over its per unit cost of
$1.00. Suppose all available economies of scale are achievable
at a production level reflecting a 50% market share and that
there are no distributional efficiencies to be gained by increas-
ing market share via a straight price cut. If the monopolist de-
cided to cut its price to $1.75, it would sell more widgets, im-
pairing its rivals' efficiencies. That price cut would therefore
enhance the widget seller's monopoly power even without im-
proving its efficiency and would, under Professor Elhauge's
test, be exclusionary and illegal. A rule that precludes monopo-
lists from cutting their supracompetitive prices, unless such
price cuts are necessary to achieve productive efficiencies, is in-
consistent with the very goal of antitrust law, which is to pro-
tect consumers from supracompetitive prices. 10 5
In addition, the approach is fundamentally inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's Brooke Group decision, which held
that an antitrust violation could not arise from a price cut that
leads to above-cost pricing. 10 6 There is great debate as to
whether Brooke Group reaches structured discounts-either
single-product purchase target discounts or bundled dis-
counts.' 07 But there can be no question that the case reaches a
103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
104. Elhauge, Monopolization Standards, supra note 71, at 330.
105. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 22 (1978) ("In the Su-
preme Court's first substantive Sherman Act decisions, Justice Peckham...
chose consumer welfare as the law's guiding policy .... ). But see Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 68-69 (1982)
(suggesting that original goals of antitrust laws included distributional objec-
tives).
106. 509 U.S. at 222-23.
107. Compare LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
20051 1715
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
straightforward price cut. If such a price cut results in a price
above cost, the price cut is legal per se. Professor Elhauge's ap-
proach would condemn discounting single products to above-
cost price levels when the discounting increases the price-
cutter's market share (and thus reduces rivals' efficiencies)
without also increasing the price-cutter's efficiency.10S Brooke
Group would not countenance that result.
Finally, even if the approach were consistent with anti-
trust policy and precedent, it would still be deficient because it
is difficult to administer, would require fact finders to engage
in rather sophisticated economic analysis, fails to offer dis-
counters a reliable safe harbor, and thus is likely to chill pro-
consumer discounting. As noted, Professor Elhauge's approach
would require a fact finder to determine whether a discounting
policy increased the efficiency of the discounter and whether
the policy somehow went beyond what was necessary to achieve
those efficiency benefits. 109 Thus, any business that offered a
bundled discount would face a risk that a jury would conclude
either that the discounting program did not create productive
or distributional efficiencies or that the efficiencies that were
created could have been achieved by offering a smaller discount
or by requiring fewer purchases to qualify for the discount. A
jury could award treble damages if convinced that the defen-
dant was giving up surplus (to consumers, incidentally) not be-
cause doing so was necessary to achieve some productive or dis-
tributional efficiencies but because doing so would win market
share from rivals, thereby reducing their efficiencies. The pos-
sibility of an adverse treble damages judgment and the lack of
any reliable safe harbor would likely deter proconsumer bun-
banc) (rejecting the view that Brooke Group's holding regarding prerequisites
to liability for predatory pricing applies to bundled discounts), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 2932 (2004), with Brief for Amici Curiae Morgan Stanley et al. at 10,
LePage's Inc. (No. 02-1865), available at 2003 WL 22428378 ("Because the
bundled rebates did not rise to the level of an illegal tie or otherwise violate
Section 1 [sic] whether they would harm competition by unjustifiably exclud-
ing even equally efficient competitors from the market had to be determined in
accordance with the pricing principles most recently articulated in Brooke
Group."), and Brief for Amicus Curiae the Business Roundtable at 9-10,
LePage's Inc. (No. 02-1865), available at 2003 WL 22428382 (arguing that
Brooke Group's below-cost pricing requirement applies to bundled discounts).
108. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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dled discounts11° and constrain the size of bundled discounts
that were offered."1
In sum, an evaluative approach that determines the legal-
ity of bundled discounts based on whether rivals' costs have
been raised unjustifiably is unworkable. The problem with the
approach is that much (perhaps most) procompetitive conduct
raises rivals' costs, 112 and it is difficult to provide an easily ad-
ministrable, but not overly proscriptive, means of determining
when such cost raising is "justifiable." If the justifiability of
raising rivals' costs is determined on a case-by-case basis, as
Tom, Balto, and Averitt suggest, then business planners will be
left with no definitive guidelines or safe harbors and will there-
fore be deterred in their discounting by the prospects of a treble
damages award based on a mistaken jury finding. 113 If justifi-
ability is determined, as Professor Elhauge suggests, by asking
whether the discounting creates productive or distributional ef-
ficiencies for the discounter, then the approach (in addition to
being excessively difficult to administer) will be overly proscrip-
tive, for it will condemn desirable pricing practices that have
been expressly approved by the Supreme Court. 114 Perhaps it
would be possible to articulate an easily administrable, and not
overly proscriptive, test for determining whether rivals' costs
are being raised "unjustifiably." The approaches proposed so
far, however, are deficient.
110. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (discussing the effi-
ciency benefits of bundling and bundled discounts).
111. It is not an adequate response to say that the plaintiff would bear the
burden of proving that the entire discount was not necessary to achieve pro-
ductive or distributional efficiencies. Practically any plaintiff could produce an
expert who could question whether a defendant's bundled discount--or some
portion thereof-actually produced productive or distributional efficiencies.
Thus, discounters would inevitably have to defend their discounting behavior
by proving that the discounts did, in fact, result in such efficiencies and did
not simply represent a transfer of surplus to consumers.
112. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 196 (2d ed. 2001) (noting
that "[o]ne way of raising a rival's costs is to be so much more efficient than
the rival that the latter is unable to reach a level of output at which to exploit
the available economies of scale"); Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worth-
while to Use Courts to Search for Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 345, 346-47 (asserting that raising rivals' costs "can be mistaken for any
other element of doing business. General Motors does not sell engines to Ford,
and this may raise Ford's costs; but the separation also is essential to ri-
valry .... ").
113. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
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C. EXCLUSIONARY IF BUNDLED DISCOUNTS COVER PRODUCTS
NOT SOLD BY RIVALS, AND THE DISCOUNTER FAILS TO PROVE AN
ADEQUATE BUSINESS JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DISCOUNTING
A third approach for evaluating bundled discounts-the
approach followed in several recently litigated cases-focuses
on the extent to which the discounter bundles products not sold
by its rivals. 115 As discussed above, the primary concern with
bundled discounts is that a discounter that bundles multiple
products and funds the total discount by giving up some margin
on each of those products may be able to usurp business from
an equally or more efficient rival that does not sell as broad a
product line, has fewer products on which to give up margin,
and thus must provide the entire value of the bundled discount
on its narrower product offering.11 6 Accordingly, some courts
have reasoned that a seller engages in exclusionary conduct
when, without an adequate business justification, it offers a
bundled discount that covers products not sold by its rivals. 117
Consider, for example, the en banc decision in LePage's.118
Plaintiff LePage's was a manufacturer of transparent tape,
which it sold as "private label" tape-tape that retailers such as
Wal-Mart and OfficeMax labeled with their own brand name. 119
Defendant 3M manufactured Scotch brand transparent tape, by
far the leading brand, as well as private label tape, Post-it
115. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155-57 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004); Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group,
L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26916 (C.D. Cal. June 10,
2004); see also Complaint, Conmed Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.,
(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 2003) (No. 03-CV-8800) (on file with author); Com-
plaint, Applied Med. Research Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., (C.D. Cal.
filed Sept. 5, 2003) (No. CV-03-1329) (on file with author).
116. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
117. See LePage's Inc., 324 F.3d at 155 ("The principal anticompetitive ef-
fect of bundled rebates... is that when offered by a monopolist they may fore-
close portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufac-
ture an equally diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a
comparable offer."); Masimo Corp., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26916, at *26-30 (relying on LePage's in denying defendant's summaryjudgment motion where defendant "bundled its oximetry products with non-
oximetry markets, thereby creating an inducement to buy from [defendant]
that [plaintiff] could not match because [plaintiff] only offers oximetry"); see
also SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1978)
(condemning bundled discount because defendant linked a product on which it
faced competition from plaintiff with products plaintiff did not sell), discussed
in note 29, supra.
118. 324 F.3d 141.
119. Id. at 144.
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Notes, and other packaging, home care, and leisure products. 120
Beginning in 1993, 3M began rebate programs that rewarded
retailers for purchasing packages of 3M products.121 The size of
available rebates was dependent upon the number of product
lines in which customers met specified purchase targets, and
the rebates covered purchases from six of 3M's product lines.
122
LePage's sued, contending that 3M, which admittedly pos-
sessed monopoly power in the transparent tape market, 123 was
monopolizing that market because customers could not meet
3M's growth targets without eliminating LePage's as a sup-
plier.124 The jury found for LePage's on its monopolization
claim. 125 On appeal, a divided panel of the Third Circuit re-
versed the jury's monopolization verdict, holding that LePage's
had failed to present proof of anticompetitive conduct.126 The
majority based its holding on the fact that LePage's "did not
even attempt to show that it could not compete by calculating
the discount that it would have had to provide in order to
match the discounts offered by 3M through its bundled re-
120. See id. at 144, 154.
121. See id. at 154.
122. Id. The evidence at trial focused on three different rebate programs.
Under [the first, the Executive Growth Fund] "EGF," 3M negotiated
volume and growth targets for each customer's purchases from the six
3M consumer product divisions involved in the EGF program. A cus-
tomer meeting the target in three or more divisions earned a volume
rebate of between 0.2-1.25% of total sales. Beginning in 1995, 3M un-
dertook to end the EGF test program and institute a rebate program
called Partnership Growth Fund ("PGF') for the same six 3M con-
sumer products divisions. Under this PGF, 3M established uniform
growth targets applicable to all participants. Customers who in-
creased their purchases from at least two divisions by $1.00, and in-
creased their total purchases by at least 12% over the previous year
qualified for the rebate, which ranged from 0.5% to 2%, depending on
the number of divisions (between two to five divisions) in which the
customer increased its purchases and the total volume of purchases.
In 1996 and 1997, 3M offered price incentives called Brand Mix
Rebates to two tape customers, Office Depot and Staples, to increase
purchases of Scotch brand tapes. 3M imposed a minimum purchase
level for tape set at the level of Office Depot's and Staples's purchases
the previous year, with "growth" factored in. To obtain a higher re-
bate, these two customers could increase their percentage of Scotch
purchases relative to certain lower-priced orders.
Id. at 170-71 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 146.
124. See id. at 160-61.
125. Id. at 145.
126. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 2002 WL 46961, at *9 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2002), va-
cated by 277 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2002), rev'd en banc, 324 F.3d 141, cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004).
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bates."127 The Third Circuit vacated the panel opinion and
granted rehearing en banc. 128 On rehearing, the court rejected
the panel's reasoning and conclusion and upheld the jury's de-
termination that 3M's structured discounts amounted to anti-
competitive conduct. 129
Of interest here is the evaluative approach the en banc
court used in considering the legality of 3M's bundled dis-
counts. 130 The court first emphasized that the principal anti-
competitive danger of bundled discounts is that they can be
used to disadvantage competitors that sell narrower product
lines and therefore must offer, across a smaller range of prod-
ucts, discounts that are at least equal in absolute dollar value
to the discounter's total discounts across all products. 13' The
court did not require, however, that LePage's prove that it
could not meet the discount without pricing below cost.132 Nor
did the court require LePage's to prove that it produced trans-
127. Id.
128. LePage's Inc., 277 F.3d 365.
129. LePage's Inc., 324 F.3d at 163-64. In upholding the verdict, the en
banc court rejected outright any suggestion that Brooke Group might insulate
3M's pricing structure, which resulted in above-cost pricing, from section 2 li-
ability. See id. at 147 (rejecting 3M's theory "that after Brooke Group no con-
duct by a monopolist who sells its product above cost-no matter how exclu-
sionary the conduct--can constitute monopolization in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act").
130. I am using the term "bundled discounts" to include rebates condi-
tioned upon purchasing the constituent parts of a bundle. The challenged con-
duct in LePage's consisted of bundled rebates. See id. at 154. Rebates, of
course, are nothing more than discounts provided after the purchase require-
ments are met.
131. Id. at 155 ("The principle anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates as
offered by 3M is that when offered by a monopolist they may foreclose portions
of the market to a potential competitor who does not manufacture an equally
diverse group of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable of-
fer.").
132. The dissent recognized this point in distinguishing the majority's rea-
soning from that employed in SmithKline v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1065,
1065 (3d Cir. 1978):
SmithKline showed that it could not compete by explaining how much
it would have had to lower prices for both small and big customers to
do so. SmithKline ascertained the rebates that Lilly was giving to
customers on all three products and calculated how much it would
have had to lower the price of its product if the rebates were all at-
tributed to the one competitive product. In contrast, LePage's did not
even attempt to show that it could not compete by calculating the dis-
count that it would have had to provide in order to match the dis-
counts offered by 3M through its bundled rebates, and thus its brief
does not point to evidence along such lines.
LePage's Inc., 324 F.3d at 175 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
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parent tape as efficiently as 3M.133 All LePage's was required to
prove was that the bundle 3M's customers had to buy to secure
the discounts included products that LePage's did not sell,
134
and that this fact made it difficult for LePage's to compete with
3M. 135 Once LePage's made that showing, the burden shifted to
3M to prove that its bundled discounts were "justified" by cost
savings of some sort.136 Because 3M failed to present proof that
selling its products in a bundled fashion reduced costs by an
amount equal to or exceeding the amount of the total bundled
discount, its bundled discounts were deemed unjustified and
thus exclusionary. 137 Accordingly, LePage's appears to hold that
(1) bundled discounts are presumptively exclusionary if the dis-
counter is bundling products not sold by its rivals and is win-
ning business from those rivals, but (2) the presumption may
be rebutted if the discounter proves a "business reasons justifi-
cation" for the bundled discounts, meaning that the bundling
saves costs approaching the amount of the total discount.
138
133. The dissent recognized this point in distinguishing the majority's rea-
soning from that employed in Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Labora-
tories, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See LePage's Inc., 324 F.3d
at 177 (Greenberg, J., dissenting). Whereas the Ortho Diagnostic court had
required the plaintiff to show "either that (a) the [defendant] monopolist has
priced below it's average variable cost or (b) the plaintiff is at least as efficient
a producer of the competitive product as the defendant, but that the defen-
dant's pricing makes it unprofitable for the plaintiff to continue to produce,"
LePage's Inc., 325 F.3d at 177 (quoting Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 920 F.
Supp. at 469), plaintiff LePage's "d[id] not contend that 3M priced its products
below average variable cost," and "LePage's's economist conceded that
LePage's is not as efficient a tape producer as 3M." Id.
134. LePage's Inc., 324 F.3d at 155-57.
135. Id. at 159-63 (documenting the "anticompetitive effect" of 3M's bun-
dled discount).
136. Id. at 163 ("It remains to consider whether defendant's actions were
carried out for 'valid business reasons,' the only recognized justification for
monopolizing."); id. at 164 ('CThe defendant bears the burden of 'persuad[ing]
the jury that its conduct was justified by any normal business purpose."') (al-
teration in original).
137. The court explained:
Although 3M alludes to its customers' desire to have single invoices
and single shipments in defense of its bundled rebates, 3M cites to no
testimony or evidence in the 55 volume appendix that would support
any actual economic efficiencies in having single invoices and/or sin-
gle shipments. It is highly unlikely that 3M shipped transparent tape
along with retail auto products or home improvement products to cus-
tomers such as Staples or that, if it did, the savings stemming from
the joint shipment approaches the millions of dollars 3M returned to
customers in bundled rebates.
Id. at 164.
138. There appears to be substantial momentum in the direction of the
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The LePage's approach is problematic for at least two rea-
sons. First, the approach may force consumers to subsidize less
efficient competitors and thus runs counter to a policy of vigor-
ous competition in which firms succeed or fail based solely on
their relative efficiencies. Given that the LePage's approach es-
chews consideration of the relative efficiency of the plaintiff (or
any other rival)139 and instead focuses on product line breadth,
any plaintiff could successfully challenge a bundled discount
simply by showing that its product line does not include prod-
ucts within the discounter's bundle. The plaintiff could enjoin
the bundled discounts, and receive treble damages, even if it
were a less efficient producer of whatever product(s) it sells in
competition with the discounter.14o Thus, the LePage's ap-
proach may essentially force consumers to "subsidize" less effi-
cient competitors by foregoing discounts that otherwise would
be available.14 1
evaluative approach employed in LePage's. Other courts have adopted the ap-
proach, see, e.g., Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., No. CV 02-
4770 MRP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26916 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2004), and plain-
tiffs have recently filed lawsuits claiming exclusion from the market by virtue
of the fact that defendants offered bundled discounts covering products plain-
tiff did not sell. See Complaint, Conmed Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.,
(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 2003) (No. 03-CV-8800) (on file with author); Com-
plaint, Applied Med. Research Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., (C.D. Cal.
filed Sept. 5, 2003) (No. 03-CV-1329) (on file with author).
139. See LePage's Inc., 324 F.3d at 177 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing majority opinion for not requiring proof of equivalent efficiency).
140. Consider, for example, the hypothetical shampoo manufacturers dis-
cussed supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text, but instead assume that the
bundled discounter is the more efficient producer. The discounter produces
shampoo at a cost of $1.25/bottle and conditioner at a cost of $2.50/bottle, sells
the shampoo and conditioner separately for $2.00 and $4.00, respectively, and
sells the package for $5.00. The plaintiff rival sells only shampoo, which costs
it $1.50/bottle to produce. Under these facts, the plaintiff would be "excluded"
by the above-cost, $5.00 price (representing a $1.00 bundled discount), for it
would have to lower its shampoo price to $1.00/bottle-well below its cost-to
compete. Thus, under the LePage's approach, the defendant's bundled discount
would be presumptively exclusionary, and the defendant could avoid liability
(and treble damages) only by showing that its $1.00 effective price cut was jus-
tified by cost savings occasioned by selling the products in a package. If the
defendant was worried about making that showing-or, more likely, was con-
cerned that a fact finder might not be persuaded by its evidence of cost sav-
ings-it would likely forego, or at least reduce the size of, the discount. Thus,
the LePage's rule would discourage discounts whose only effect (besides lower-
ing prices for consumers) would be to make it difficult for a less efficient rival
to compete.
141. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 749, at 183
("Requiring the defendant's pricing policies to protect the trade of higher cost
rivals is overly solicitous of small firms and denies customers the benefits of
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Indeed, one need not manufacture hypotheticals to demon-
strate this possibility, for this is precisely what happened in
LePage's. As the dissent emphasized, an economist hired by
LePage's admitted that LePage's was a less efficient producer
of transparent tape than 3M. 142 Thus, 3M was punished for
charging lower prices to consumers, and was ordered to stop do-
ing so to ensure that an admittedly less efficient competitor
could stay in business. LePage's itself therefore shows that the
evaluative approach adopted in the decision may ultimately
prop up less efficient rivals at the expense of consumers.
A second problem with the LePage's approach is that its fo-
cus on product line breadth threatens to chill bundling, a busi-
ness practice that frequently creates efficiencies and provides
benefits to consumers. On the sellers' side, bundling and bun-
dled discounts may reduce costs by creating economies of
scope 143 (i.e., "decreases in costs per unit of two or more prod-
ucts due to producing or marketing them together instead of
separately"'144) or by facilitating output increases so as to
achieve economies of scale. 145 The practices may also lower
costs by reducing uncertainty about aggregate demand,1 46 re-
duce overhead and marketing expenses by economizing on the
quality-signaling benefits of well-known brands, 147 and facili-
tate efficiency-enhancing differential pricing.1 48 There is also
the defendant's lower costs.").
142. LePage's Inc., 324 F.3d at 177 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
143. See, e.g., THOMAS T. NAGLE & REED K. HOLDEN, THE STRATEGY AND
TACTICS OF PRICING: A GUIDE TO PROFITABLE DECISION MAKING 306-07 (3d
ed. 2002); Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling Information Goods: In
Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency, 45 MGMT. SCI. 1613, 1619 (1999) ("Bundling
can create significant economies of scope even in the absence of technological
economies in production, distribution, or consumption."); Stremersch & Tellis,
supra note 2, at 68.
144. Stremersch & Tellis, supra note 2, at 68.
145. See, e.g., NAGLE & HOLDEN, supra note 143, at 3; Asim Ansari et al.,
Pricing a Bundle of Products or Services: The Case of Nonprofits, 33 J. MKTG.
RES. 86, 86-93 (1996).
146. Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling and Competition on the
Internet, 19 MKTG. Sci. 63, 64-65 (2002).
147. See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger, A Graphical Analysis of Bundling, 68 J.
BUS. 85, 87-97 (1995).
148. See NAGLE & HOLDEN, supra note 143, at 246 ("Rather than cutting
prices to price-sensitive customers, the value-added bundler instead offers
them an additional value of a kind that less price-sensitive buyers do not
want. With that strategy, a company can attract price-sensitive buyers with-
out reducing prices to those who are relatively price insensitive."); see also Wil-
liam J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39
J.L. & ECON. 49, 65-67 & n.17 (1996) (noting circumstances in which economic
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evidence that bundled discounts stimulate consumer demand
for the bundler's products. 149 On the buyers' side, bundled dis-
counts reduce supracompetitive prices, at least in the short
run, and buyers (especially retailers) frequently prefer purchas-
ing in bundles because doing so reduces the number of vendors
with whom they must deal. 150 For both buyers and sellers, pre-
announced bundled discounts reduce the transaction costs as-
sociated with negotiating multi-product purchases. 151 In short,
there are many procompetitive, or at worst competitively neu-
tral, reasons for bundling and thus for offering bundled dis-
counts. The LePage's approach would discourage such dis-
counts, for firms offering them would be subject to antitrust
suits by competitors that sell some, but not all, of the bundled
products.
An advocate of the LePage's approach would contend, of
course, that the approach will not inhibit procompetitive bun-
dled discounting because discounters are afforded the opportu-
nity to justify their behavior by proving that their bundled dis-
counts generate cost savings. 152 But that argument ignores the
real-world effect of placing the burden of justification on the
efficiency requires the use of differential pricing).
149. See Soman & Gourville, supra note 1, at 42-43. Soman and Gourville
demonstrate that bundled discounts can be used to influence the consumer's
decision to consume, thus permitting marketers to stimulate demand for their
products and to manage consumption of prepaid products and services. Id. at
32-42.
150. See, e.g., Philip B. Evans & Thomas S. Wurster, Strategy and the New
Economics of Information, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 70, 79-80 (1997); Robert J. Vo-
kurka, Supplier Partnerships: A Case Study, 39 PROD. & INVENTORY MGMT. J.
30 (1998). In competing for the business of retailers, multi-product vendors
increasingly find it necessary to offer proconsumer bundled product discounts.
See, e.g., Gary D. Eppen et al., Bundling-New Products, New Markets, Low
Risk, 32 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 7, 7-12 (1991); Ovans, supra note 2, at 20 (quot-
ing the author of one study of 100 companies using bundles for the proposition
that bundling reduces information and transaction costs for consumers:
"'When done correctly, bundling provides customers with simplicity and order
in an otherwise chaotic world."'); Stremersch & Tellis, supra note 2, at 70 ("we
find that product bundling of existing products may be optimal because it cre-
ates added value for consumers, saves costs, and creates differentiation in
highly competitive markets.").
151. See NAGLE & HOLDEN, supra note 143, at 245.
152. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004). Under LePage's, once a plaintiff estab-
lished that the defendant was offering discounts on bundles that included
products its rivals did not sell, the defendant's bundled discount would be
deemed exclusionary unless the defendant could prove, to the satisfaction of a
jury, that the amount of the discount did not exceed the efficiency benefits
created by selling the products in a bundle. See id.
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discounter. Any business considering whether to offer a bun-
dled discount covering products not sold by some rivals would
have to ensure in advance that it could convince a jury that the
discount created cost savings at least equal to the amount of
profit sacrificed. 153 For example, any monopolist participating
in multiple product markets would be reluctant to offer a dis-
count on any product bundle that included its monopoly prod-
uct-the very product for which it is most likely to charge a su-
pracompetitive price-because its rival(s) presumably could not
replicate the bundle.154 Similarly, a multi-product firm that
competed with similarly diversified firms would be dissuaded
from engaging in consumer-friendly bundle-to-bundle competi-
tion. Suppose, for example, that firm A-like its four chief ri-
vals, B, C, D, and E-sells products 1, 2, and 3 and believes
that it could win business from those rivals by offering a pack-
age discount on the three products. If tiny emergent rival F
sells only product 1, A is unlikely to offer the package discount,
even if it could be matched by rivals B-E (assuming their equal
efficiency) and would reflect consumer desires for package pric-
ing. 155 These results follow from the LePage's approach's insis-
153. See id. at 164 (rejecting 3M's business reasons justification because
3M did not prove that "the savings stemming from [selling the products in a
bundled fashion] approach[ed] the millions of dollars 3M returned to custom-
ers in bundled rebates").
154. The monopoly product presumably would not be sold by rivals compet-
ing with the monopolist in other product markets.
155. The medical device bundling cases involve challenges to this sort of
bundle-to-bundle competition. Both Johnson & Johnson, Inc. (parent company
of Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. and Ethicon, Inc.) and Tyco (parent company of
United States Surgical Corp.) sell broad lines of sutures (stitches) and endo-
mechanical surgical devices used in minimally invasive laparoscopic surgery.
See HOOVER'S, INC., United States Surgical Corporation, in HOOVER'S IN-
DEPTH COMPANY RECORDS (2005) (discussing "fierce rivalry" between United
States Surgical Corp. and Johnson & Johnson, Inc. subsidiaries and noting
that such rivalry resulted in a "fierce price war for both sutures and laparo-
scopic products"), at 2005 WLNR 4491141. In an attempt to win the business
of large hospital purchasing organizations, both companies have offered sub-
stantial discounts on bundles of sutures and endo-mechanical devices. See
Hospital Group Purchasing: Has the Market Become More Open to Competi-
tion?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Con-
sumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 189-204 (2003)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Said Hilal, President and Chief Executive
Officer of Applied Medical Resources Corp.) (describing bundled discounts of-
fered by large, diversified medical supply companies); Joanne M. Todd, Market
Memo: J&J, U.S. Surgical Maintain MIS Product Market Dominance, HEALTH
INDUS. TODAY (Aug. 1998) (describing how intense competition in the "mini-
mally invasive surgery" market led Johnson & Johnson, Inc. and United
States Surgical Corp. to offer bundled discounts to group purchasing organiza-
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tence that bundled discounters with less diversified rivals
prove that their discounts create cost savings in excess of any
surplus transferred to consumers.
The burden here is misplaced. Given that an above-cost
bundled discount always provides some procompetitive benefit
(in that it drives prices closer to the level of costs, which is
where they would be in perfect competition) 156 and always pro-
vides some immediate consumer benefit (lower prices), it seems
perverse to burden the defendant with "justifying" its discount.
The law instead ought to require the plaintiff to prove that the
discounting scheme is designed to be exclusionary rather than
procompetitive. Part III explains how the law could do this
without requiring the plaintiff to produce, and the judicial tri-
bunal to evaluate, amorphous "intent" evidence.
D. EXCLUSIONARY IF ACTUAL PLAINTIFF IS EQUALLY EFFICIENT
AND IS UNABLE TO COMPETE
As noted, an evaluative approach focused on the relative
breadth of the discounter's bundle vis-A-vis its rivals' product
lines may condemn discounts that would exclude only less effi-
cient rivals and may, as in LePage's itself, force consumers to
subsidize rivals that are less efficient than the discounter. 157
Accordingly, some courts have reasoned that a competitor com-
plaining of an above-cost bundled discount should have to prove
that it is at least as efficient a producer of the competitive prod-
uct as the discounter. 158 Requiring such proof would, of course,
tions), at http://www.findarticles.con/p/articles/mi m3498/is_1998_August/ai_
54028824+U.S.+Surgical+Bundle&hl=en. A few tiny rivals, however, have
sought to thwart this price competition on grounds that they do not sell as
broad a line of products as Johnson & Johnson, Inc. and Tyco and therefore
cannot offer competing bundles. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing lawsuits brought by small medical device suppliers against Johnson &
Johnson, Inc. and Tyco); cf. Hearing, supra at 199 (stating that Applied Medi-
cal Resources Corp. lost a major supply contract because it "did not have the
rest of the products that Johnson & Johnson and Tyco bundled with the tro-
cars"); Mary Williams Walsh, New Scrutiny Aimed at Bundled Sale of Hospital
Supplies, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2003, at C1 (describing antitrust challenges to
Johnson & Johnson, Inc.'s bundled discounts).
156. Cf. 2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 100, 402(b)(2), at 6 (noting that in
perfect competition, price will be driven to the level of marginal cost); 10
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & EINER ELHAUGE, ANTITRUST
LAW 1758(0, at 334 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that a "package discount brings
that price closer to the competitive level and increases output in both the tying
and tied products").
157. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
158. See LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 2002 WL 46961, at *9-10 (3d Cir. Jan. 14,
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prevent less efficient competitors from using the law to create a
"price umbrella" that would shield them from vigorous price
competition.
This approach is best exemplified by the Ortho Diagnostic
opinion. 159 The issue before the court in that case was whether
defendant Abbott, which sold five types of (noninterchange-
able) blood tests, had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act 160
by providing discounts on packages of its different types of
blood tests. 161 The plaintiff, Ortho, manufactured blood tests
that competed with three of Abbott's five tests. 62 Abbott pro-
vided a discount on all of a purchaser's blood test purchases if
the purchaser bought at least four types of tests from Abbott,
and it offered a higher discount to purchasers who bought all
five of its tests. 163 Ortho complained that the discount policy
unfairly disadvantaged Ortho because it could compete with
Abbott only by offering the full value of Abbott's five-product
discount on its own three-product selection.164 Ortho did not
demonstrate that Abbott was pricing its discounted package be-
low cost or that Ortho was as efficient a producer as Abbott but
was unable to compete because of the discounting strategy. 165
The court rejected Abbott's claim that its discounting
should be deemed per se legal because it resulted in above-cost
prices. The court first observed that the "below-cost" require-
ment for predatory pricing "is a vehicle designed to identify
cases in which the defendant has priced its product at a level
that creates the risk of depriving consumers of the benefits of
competition from firms at least as efficient as the defendant."'166
The court then concluded that the below-cost test might be un-
derinclusive when bundled discounts are at issue, for even
2002), vacated by 277 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2002), rev'd en banc, 324 F.3d 141, cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004); Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
159. 920 F. Supp. 455.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
161. 920 F. Supp. at 458.
162. Id. at 459.
163. Id. at 460.
164. Id. at 461-62. In other words, Ortho would have had to discount each
of its products more than Abbott did to offer a competitive discount to consum-
ers. See id.
165. Id. at 469.
166. Id. at 466-67 (noting also that "below-cost pricing, unlike pricing at or
above that level, carries with it the threat that the party so engaged will drive
equally efficient competitors out of business, thus setting the stage for re-
coupment at the expense of consumers").
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above-cost bundled discounts may have exclusionary effects
where the discounter participates in more product markets
than its competitors and is therefore able to spread the total
discount over all those product lines and to force competitors to
provide the entire dollar amount of the discount on a smaller
collection of products. 167
Having rejected the per se legality approach, the court did
not ask whether the discounter's conduct unjustifiably "raised
rivals' costs," nor did it presumptively condemn the bundled
discounts simply because the bundle included products the
plaintiff did not sell. Instead, the court attempted to articulate
a test that would condemn only those bundled discounts that
would exclude a plaintiff that was as efficient as the discounter.
Recognizing that discounting is usually procompetitive, the
court held that a plaintiff complaining of bundled discounts
must show that the pricing strategy somehow threatens equally
or more efficient firms. 168 To do so, the plaintiff must demon-
strate either that the discounted bundled price is below the av-
erage variable cost of the bundle or that the plaintiff is at least
as efficient a producer of the competitive product as the defen-
dant but cannot charge prices high enough to turn a profit be-
cause of the defendant's pricing.16 9 In its ultimately vacated
opinion, the panel majority in LePage's appeared to adopt a
similar approach for evaluating bundled discounts. 170
167. Id. at 467-68. To illustrate this point, the court offered a version of
the shampoo/conditioner example discussed above. See supra notes 25-27 and
accompanying text.
168. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 920 F. Supp. at 469.
169. Id. Specifically, the court held that:
[A] Section 2 plaintiff in... a case in which a monopolist (1) faces
competition on only part of a complementary group of products, (2) of-
fers the products both as a package and individually, and (3) effec-
tively forces its competitors to absorb the differential between the
bundled and unbundled prices of the product in which the monopolist
has market power-must allege and prove either that (a) the monopo-
list has priced below its average variable cost or (b) the plaintiff is at
least as efficient a producer of the competitive product as the defen-
dant, but that the defendant's pricing makes it unprofitable for the
plaintiff to continue to produce.
Id.
170. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 2002 WL 46961, at *9 (3d Cir. Jan. 14, 2002), va-
cated by 277 F.3d 365 (3d Cir. 2002), rev'd en banc, 324 F.3d 141, cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004). On rehearing, of course, the en banc majority rejected
the approach. See LePage's Inc., 324 F.3d at 175-77 (Greenberg, J., dissenting)
(noting that the en banc court had lowered the quantum of proof required to
establish exclusionary conduct).
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While the Ortho Diagnostic approach avoids forcing pur-
chasers to subsidize less efficient competitors by foregoing dis-
counts, the approach creates serious administrability difficul-
ties. 171 Under the approach, a plaintiff would have to prove,
and a judicial tribunal would have to determine, what the
plaintiff's per unit production and distribution costs are and
how those costs compare to the defendant's per unit costs. As-
certaining costs is notoriously difficult, 172 and proving another
party's costs is even more difficult, given that the relevant evi-
dence is in that other party's control.
Of course, the difficulty of proving another's costs cannot,
by itself, doom the Ortho Diagnostic approach, for well-
established doctrine requires plaintiffs complaining of preda-
tory pricing to make precisely such a showing. 173 But the bur-
den the Ortho Diagnostic approach places on plaintiffs and ju-
dicial tribunals exceeds the burden in run-of-the-mill predatory
pricing cases. First, the approach requires the plaintiff to make
(and the tribunal to evaluate) two cost showings: the plaintiff
must prove its own per unit costs as well as the defendant's. In
a predatory pricing case, by contrast, the defendant's cost is
compared to price, which is easily ascertainable. Second, de-
termining the defendant's cost in a bundled discount case will
likely be particularly complicated because there will always be
joint costs-i.e., costs pertaining to two different products. 174
171. On the need for antitrust standards to be easily administrable, see
Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)
("[Antitrust rules are court-administered rules. They must be clear enough for
lawyers to explain them to clients. They must be administratively workable
and therefore cannot always take account of every complex economic circum-
stance or qualification."); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman
Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 148 (2005) ("A workable definition of exclusionary
conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act... must be administrable by a
court, perhaps in a jury trial."); Hovenkamp, supra note 68, at 269, 272-73;
Fred S. McChesney, Talking 'Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for
and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1414 (2003) ("Opti-
mal minimization of error requires not just rules that are substantively sound,
but also ones relatively easy for courts to apply correctly.").
172. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 740, at 423-40; Dennis
W. Carlton, A General Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct and Refusal to Deal-
Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 659, 664 (2001) (not-
ing that "it is well-known that calculating marginal costs from accounting data
is difficult").
173. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 222 (1992) ("[A] plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting
from a rival's low prices must prove that the prices complained of are below an
appropriate measure of its rival's costs.").
174. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 749, at 182 n.35.
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Joint costs are inevitable in this context because every bundled
discounter, unlike every predatory pricing defendant, produces
multiple products and sells them together. Thus, the bundled
discounter incurs, at a minimum, common marketing costs.
Moreover, the discounter will generally incur common costs re-
lated to manufacturing, packaging, transportation, invoicing,
and overhead. Determining how to allocate these common costs
among the competitive product and the other products for
which the costs were incurred (some of which might not even be
included within the bundle) can be exceedingly difficult-
arbitrary, in fact.175 Proving a discounter's costs will therefore
be particularly difficult when bundled discounts are involved.
Thus, the Ortho Diagnostic approach, while properly focusing
on whether an equally efficient rival is being excluded by a
bundled discount, creates intractable difficulties of administra-
bility and is likely to underdeter truly exclusionary bundled
pricing, for plaintiffs will find it difficult to make the showing
necessary to establish illegality. Moreover, if the plaintiff hap-
pens not to be the discounter's most efficient rival, it is possible
that the plaintiff's legal challenge will not prevail (because the
plaintiff is not an equally efficient rival) but that there are, or
could in the future be, equally efficient rivals that would be ex-
cluded by the defendant's bundled discounts. Thus, the Ortho
Diagnostic approach may require multiple lawsuits where the
plaintiff is not the rival best able to match the discounter's pro-
ductive efficiencies.
E. EXCLUSIONARY IF HYPOTHETICAL EQUALLY EFFICIENT RIvAL
WOULD BE UNJUSTIFIABLY EXCLUDED
In light of the difficulties associated with Ortho Diagnos-
tic's evaluative approach, the leading antitrust treatise, Anti-
trust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Appli-
cation (Antitrust Law),176 advocates an alternative approach
175. See generally 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 742, at 461
(discussing difficulty of allocating,joint costs); 10 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, &
ELHAUGE, supra note 156, 1758(f), at 335 ("Proving costs is always difficult
and tracing them to particular products is even more difficult. Indeed, allocat-
ing joint costs among the products in a package is arbitrary even in theory.").
176. PHILIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW (1978). The Antitrust Law
treatise is so extensively relied on by antitrust lawyers and judges that "U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer once remarked that most lawyers
would prefer to have on their side 'two paragraphs of Areeda on antitrust than
four Courts of Appeals and three Supreme Court Justices."' Langdell's West
Wing Renamed in Honor of Areeda, HARv. GAZErTE (Apr. 25, 1996), avail-
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that similarly seeks to ensure that only equally (or more) effi-
cient rivals are protected but that would be easier to adminis-
ter and less likely to underdeter or to require multiple lawsuits.
Under the Antitrust Law approach, a court deciding whether an
above-cost bundled discount is exclusionary 177 would ask not
whether the particular plaintiff is as efficient as the discounter
but instead whether the discount would, without reasonable
justification, exclude a hypothetical equally efficient rival.178
Thus, in the LePage's case, the approach "would not have re-
quired LePage's to provide evidence that it could not compete
against 3M's multi-product discounts; rather, [the approach]
would [have] require[d] it to show that a hypothetical equally
efficient firm making only one of the products subject to the
bundled rebate could not have competed successfully." 179 The
treatise maintains that "a requirement that the bundling prac-
tice be sufficiently severe to exclude an equally efficient single-
product rival, and without an adequate business justification,
seems to strike about the right balance between permitting ag-
gressive pricing while prohibiting conduct that can only be
characterized as anticompetitive."'1
80
Antitrust Law's proposed approach would avoid several of
the difficulties inherent in the Ortho Diagnostic approach.
First, the former approach would be easier to administer be-
cause ascertaining whether an equally efficient rival would be
excluded is simpler than determining whether the plaintiff it-
self is as efficient a producer of the competitive product as the
able at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/1996/04.25/LangdellsWestWi.
html (last visited Feb. 26, 2005).
177. A bundled discount resulting in a package price below the cost of the
package would presumably be adjudged under the straightforward predatory
pricing principles announced in Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 222. See 3
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 749, at 509-12.
178. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 749, at 182 ("The
relevant question is not necessarily whether a particular plaintiff was equally
efficient, but whether the challenged bundling practices would have excluded
an equally efficient rival, without reasonable justification.").
179. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2003, supra note 21, 749, at 83.
180. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 749, at 182-83.
The treatise explains:
Requiring the defendant's pricing policies to protect the trade of
higher-cost rivals is overly solicitous of small firms and denies cus-
tomers the benefits of the defendant's lower costs. Further, if the
practice will exclude an equally efficient rival, then it will exclude
whether or not the rival is equally efficient in fact.
Id. 749, at 183 (citations omitted).
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bundled discounter.' 8 ' In addition, the approach would avoid
Ortho Diagnostic's problems of underdeterrence and multiple
lawsuits. Relieved of the difficult burden of proving their equal
efficiency, plaintiffs would be more likely to sue over truly ex-
clusionary bundled discounts, and plaintiffs who turned out not
to be as efficient as the discounter could still stop truly exclu-
sionary discounts, thereby eliminating the need for others to
sue, by proving that some other (actual or hypothetical) equally
efficient rival would be excluded by the discounts.
But the Antitrust Law approach presents its own difficul-
ties. As an initial matter, the approach conflicts with the trea-
tise's treatment of package pricing-which is, of course, a form
of bundled discounting. 8 2 Recognizing that discounts on pack-
ages of disparate products are usually procompetitive because
they reflect cost savings 8 3 and/or move supracompetitive prices
toward costs, 8 4 the treatise suggests that challenges to pack-
age pricing ought to be difficult to mount. 8 5 Package pricing
should not be condemned as predatory pricing, the treatise con-
tends, as long as the price of the package exceeds the package's
total cost. 8 6 In other words, a tribunal should not attribute the
total amount of any package discount to a single product within
the package and ask whether that product, as discounted, is
181. Id. 749, at 182 (contending that the proposed approach is preferable
on grounds of administrability because, while "proving whether a hypothetical
equally efficient rival is excluded by a multi-product discount is typically quite
manageable.... [P]roof that the plaintiff is equally efficient can be quite diffi-
cult, particularly in cases where the defendant produces a larger product line
than the plaintiff and there are joint costs").
182. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
183. 10 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, & ELHAUGE, supra note 156, 1758(d)(1), at
329-30 (noting that "[p]ackaging two products together often reduces costs"
and that "[flailure to legitimize cost savings hospitably would overdeter the
common, often procompetitive, and seldom anticompetitive package discount").
184. 10 id. 1758(f), at 334 ("[T]he package discount brings that price
closer to the competitive level and increases output in both the tying and tied
products.").
185. See generally 10 id. 1758, at 323-36.
186. 10 id. 1758(0, at 334 ("[W]e do not find predatory pricing so long as
the package price exceeds the total relevant cost of the package."); 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 749, at 509 (contending that "[c]ourts should
not entertain claims that while a defendant's overall price is remunerative,
the separate 'price' for one particular component is predatory"); see also 3 id.
749, at 510-11 (criticizing Multistate Legal Studies, Inc. v. Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich Legal & Professional Publications, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1549 n.7
(10th Cir. 1995), for finding predation by attributing the total amount of pack-
age discount to a single product within package and asking whether that
product, as discounted, was priced below cost).
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priced below cost; instead, it should ask whether the package
price exceeds the sum of the costs of the products within the
package.' 8 7 If so, then the package pricing should be deemed
legal as long as it does not amount to de facto tying.188 Whether
package pricing amounts to de facto tying, then, depends on
whether the package discount has an effect similar to an out-
right refusal to sell the packaged products separately. 8 9 That
187. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 749, at 510 ("[lit is difficult
to think of a more anticompetitive antitrust rule than one requiring that the
full cost of each product improvement or increment must be accompanied by a
price increase fully offsetting the costs.").
188. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 1807(c), at 285
(noting that if the package price is above the cost of the package, there can be
no predatory pricing and that "[t]he real competitive harm, if any, comes from
tying via a package discount of two or more different products").
189. 10 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, & ELHAUGE, supra note 156, 1758(a), at
323 (noting that whether there is de facto tying depends on "whether the dis-
count has an effect similar to an outright refusal to sell [the] tying product...
separately"). Antitrust Law "reject[s], as have most courts, the two polar posi-
tions that every package discount proves a tie or that separate availability ne-
gates a tie." 10 id. 1758(b), at 325. Deeming every package discount an ille-
gal tie is improper because "package discounts might promote competition by
bringing some package cost savings to consumers, by accommodating hetero-
geneous buyer preferences, or by helping undermine supracompetitive prices
in the tying or tied market." 10 id. Conversely, deeming voluntary package
discounts to be per se not a tie "would eviscerate tying scrutiny ... for any
seller could tie with impunity simply by setting a sufficiently large package
discount." 10 id. 1758(b), at 326. A number of courts have similarly recog-
nized that a sufficiently large package discount may constitute a de facto tie.
See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 464 (1922)
(noting that package discount might have an "effect ... so onerous as to com-
pel" the buyer to take the package but finding conflict in testimony about
whether such effect was present); Virtual Maint., Inc. v. Prime Computer, 957
F.2d 1318, 1318 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 910 (1992)
(package discount a tie); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Broad. -Paramount
Theatres, 388 F.2d 272, 284 (2d Cir. 1967) (observing that allowing defendant
to avoid tying claim "merely by setting a pre-established price for each indi-
vidual item-even if that price is rarely if ever charged and is, in relation to
the package price, fanciful and unjustified by cost-would mean that the anti-
trust laws could be flouted at will"); Nobel Scientific Indus. v. Beckman In-
struments, 670 F. Supp. 1313, 1324 (D. Md. 1986) (same (quoting Ways &
Means v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1979)), affd, 831 F.2d
537 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089,
1110-11 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (same); Ways & Means v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp.
697, 701 (N.D. Cal. 1979) ("[S]eparate availability will not preclude antitrust
liability where a defendant has established its pricing policy in such a way
that the only viable economic option is to purchase the tying and tied products
in a single package."), af'd, 638 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Robert's
Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1199, 1208
(D. Haw. 1980) (noting that a package discount might be a tie if no one would
buy the tying product separately), affd, 732 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1984).
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question, the treatise maintains, should be answered by focus-
ing on the "proportion of separate purchases"-that is, the per-
centage of purchases of "tied" product B, by purchasers who
buy both the defendant's "tying" product A and any seller's
product B, that are outside the defendant's package. 190 The
treatise suggests that if separate purchases exceed 10%, there
should be no illegal tie. 191 In addition, the treatise posits three
"safe harbors" where a tie should not be found even if separate
purchases are less than 10%.192 The upshot of this analysis is
that a plaintiff attacking package pricing must prove either (1)
that the package price is less than the sum of the costs of the
products within the package (in which case the package pricing
is predatory), or (2) that the "proportion of separate purchases"
is less than 10% and none of the three safe harbors applies (in
which case the package pricing constitutes de facto tying).
In contrast, Antitrust Law's approach to bundled discount-
ing would require a plaintiff to show merely that "the chal-
lenged bundling practices would have excluded an equally effi-
cient rival."1 93 A plaintiff could do so by showing that attrib-
190. 10 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, & ELHAUGE, supra note 156, 1758(b), at
325-28. For example, if there are 100 purchasers who buy tied product A from
the defendant and tied product B from anyone (the defendant or anyone else),
and sixty of those purchasers take B as well as A from the defendant, the
"proportion of separate purchases" is 40%.
191. 10 id. 1758(b), at 328; 10 Id. 1756(b)(2), at 300.
192. See 10 id. 1758(e), at 332-33. Given that the concern of tying law is
"that the price for the tying product separately has been so artificially inflated
that it is not realistically available separately," 10 id. 1758(e), at 332, the
treatise maintains that courts should decline to find a tie when either (1) the
separate price of tying product A is less than or equal to the market price of A,
10 id., (2) the package price of tied product B (i.e., the price of the package less
the separate price of tying product A) exceeds or equals the market price of B,
10 id. 1758(e), at 332-33, or (3) the package price of B exceeds or equals the
marginal cost of rivals' B, 10 id. 1758(e), at 333 (noting that "[t]his excess
means that any inducement to take the defendant's package results from its
rivals' insistence on charging supracompetitive prices for the tied product"). In
the first two situations, there can be no legitimate concern that the defendant
has raised the separate price of tying product A to induce buyers to purchase
the package. In the third, there is no injury to competition because the defen-
dants' rivals could compete by reducing their prices to competitive levels. 10
id. 1758(e), at 332-33.
193. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 749, at 182. This
exclusionary effect must occur, according to the treatise, "without reasonable
justification." Id. Presumably, that means that the defendant would be per-
mitted to show some efficiency justification for the bundled discounting. As
explained above, see supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text, this rebuttal
opportunity would not be sufficient to prevent the chilling of procompetitive
bundled discounting.
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uting the entire amount of the bundled discount to the competi-
tive product results in an effective price for that product that is
below the defendant's cost, so that an equally efficient single-
product seller could not match, and thus would be excluded by,
the bundled discount. That, however, is precisely the showing
the treatise says is insufficient to prove that package pricing is
predatory. 194 Moreover, there is no requirement that the plain-
tiff establish tying (actual or de facto), which the treatise else-
where says is the "real competitive harm" occasioned by pack-
age pricing. 195
To see the tension in the treatise's disparate treatment of
package pricing'96 and bundled discounts, 197 consider a situa-
tion where a defendant offers a discount on a package consist-
ing of products A and B, and its rival (the plaintiff) sells prod-
uct A but not product B. Suppose that, when the total amount
of the discount is allocated to product A, that product is priced
below the defendant's cost, but that the discounted price of the
A-B package exceeds the sum of the defendant's costs of A and
B. Suppose further that only 70% of purchasers who buy both A
and B, and buy at least one of the products from the defendant,
partake of the discount by also buying the other product from
the defendant. 198 If viewed as package pricing, the treatise
would approve this scheme, for it is neither predatory pricing
(because the package cost does not exceed the package price)199
nor tying (because the "proportion of separate purchases" ex-
ceeds 10%).200 If viewed as a bundled discount, however, the
treatise would presumptively condemn the scheme, for a hypo-
thetical competitor that was equally as efficient as the defen-
194. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
195. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SuPP. 2004, supra note 27, 1807(c), at 285.
Cf. 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 749, at 510 ("Of course, the
bundling of the car and the stereo may foreclose rival stereo makers, but that
concern results from tying, not from predatory pricing.").
196. See generally 10 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, & ELHAUGE, supra note 156,
1758; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 1807(c), at 284-
85.
197. See generally AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27,
749, at 174-84.
198. Put differently, the "proportion of separate purchases" is 30%. See su-
pra note 190.
199. See 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 749, at 509-11; 10
AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, & ELHAUGE, supra note 156, 1758, at 334-35;
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 1807(c), at 285.
200. See 10 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, & ELHAUGE, supra note 156, 1758(b),
at 328. 10 id. 1756(b)(2), at 300.
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dant but sold only product A could not stay in business. 20 1
Thus, Antitrust Law's approach to bundled discounting is in-
consistent with its treatment of package pricing-which is
really the same thing.
A more significant difficulty with the Antitrust Law ap-
proach is that it would reduce consumer welfare by preventing
a multi-product seller from funding a discount on a bundle of
its products by giving up margin on one or more supracompeti-
tively priced products within the bundle. Suppose, for example,
that the defendant discounter sells products A, B, and C in con-
centrated markets that are subject to oligopolistic pricing but
are not actually cartelized (there are no actual agreements re-
garding price).202 Assume that the plaintiff competes with the
defendant in the market for product A but does not sell either
product B or C. The defendant's cost of producing each of prod-
ucts A, B, and C is $4 per unit. Sold separately, the defendant
charges $5 per unit for each of A, B, and C, but it sells the A-B-
C package for $13.50. This package pricing more closely aligns
the defendant's prices and costs and will tend to destabilize the
coordinated supracompetitive pricing in each of the A, B, and C
markets. 203 From the standpoint of consumers and competition,
201. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 749, at 182
(proposing that the legality of a bundled discount turn on "whether the chal-
lenged bundling practices would have excluded an equally efficient rival, with-
out reasonable justification").
202. Pricing in oligopolistic markets (markets in which a few large sellers
account for the bulk of the output) tends to depart from the competitive norm
of prices equal to marginal cost, even without actual price agreements among
sellers. See 2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 100, 404(b), at 10-14.
203. Ironically, the Antitrust Law treatise elsewhere recognizes these bene-
fits of permitting the sort of discount cross-subsidization that its approach to
bundled discounting would forbid. With respect to the "pushing-prices-toward-
costs" benefit, the treatise explains:
When the package price exceeds its costs but pushes the tied prod-
uct's price within the package below its own costs, the defendant's
separate price for the tying product must exceed the relevant costs of
making the tying product. Thus, the tying product's price must be su-
pracompetitive, and the package discount brings that price closer to
the competitive level and increases output in both the tying and tied
products. Because of rising output in both products, this is not a case
of "monopoly profit" in the tying product allegedly funding predatory
pricing in the tied product. Unlike standard predatory pricing, more-
over, the expansion in output need not be temporary; nor is there any
loss that needs to be recouped by future monopoly pricing. Tying
market rivals can hardly demand that antitrust law protect their su-
pracompetitive prices.
10 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, & ELHAUGE, supra note 156, 1758, at 334-35.
With respect to the "destabilizing-oligopolistic-pricing" benefit, the treatise
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this is a good thing: prices have been pushed toward costs
(where they would be in a perfectly competitive market), oli-
gopolistic pricing has been disrupted (and nondiscounting ri-
vals are likely to respond with discounts of their own), and con-
sumers are paying less. 20 4 The Antitrust Law approach,
however, would condemn this arrangement because a hypo-
thetical A seller whose per unit cost is $4 (i.e., a "hypothetical
equally efficient" A seller) would have to lower its A price to
$3.50 to compete and would thus be driven out of business.20 5
The approach may therefore condemn discount cross-
subsidization that would be good for consumers and competi-
tion in the long run.
Finally, the Antitrust Law approach is troubling because
its lax requirements for imposing liability would allow plain-
tiffs to condemn even bundled discounts that likely could not
exacerbate monopolistic pricing. The approach does not require
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they could not match the bundled
discount by entering the markets in which they do not cur-
rently participate. Neither does it require them to prove that
the market in which they do participate is structurally suscep-
tible to monopolistic pricing. Absent such proof, plaintiffs can-
not establish any genuine likelihood of consumer harm, and
they should not be permitted to thwart immediate consumer
benefits (lower prices) without proving such a likelihood.
states:
[Sluch indirect price cutting on the tying product [that is, giving up
margin on one (or more) product(s) in the bundle to subsidize the
other bundled product(s)] has a special potential for disrupting oli-
gopolistic coordination. Rival oligopolists may be uncertain whether
the price cut is on the tying or tied product. They may also not know
whether the defendant is "cheating" or merely passing on a package
cost saving. Moreover, they may not retaliate because the price cut
will be limited to those purchasers of the tying product who want the
tied product and choose the package. In addition, such a selective
price cut is less expensive for the defendant than an across-the-board
price cut on all tying product sales. For all these reasons, the defen-
dant may attempt the price cut. Not only does the defendant's price
cut benefit buyers, it can weaken oligopolistic collaboration more
widely.
10 id. 1 1758, at 335.
204. Indeed, the Antitrust Law treatise elsewhere acknowledges that it
would be perverse antitrust policy to require the full cost of any "increment" to
be accompanied by a price increase fully offsetting that cost. 3 AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 749, at 510. The treatise's treatment of bundled
discounts, though, would require that the cost of each bundled "increment" be
accompanied by a fully offsetting price increase.
205. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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The Antitrust Law approach would impose liability based
upon a mere "show[ing] that a hypothetical equally efficient
firm making only one of the products subject to the bundled re-
bate could not have competed successfully. 206 This test could
provide undue protection for firms that are inefficient with re-
spect to scope (i.e., that do not produce an optimal mix of prod-
ucts), for in many cases a single-product rival could feasibly be-
gin selling the other products in the bundle. Where entry into
the other product markets is easy, the law should not condemn
bundled discounts just so that rivals will not have to enter
those markets. Entry would increase competition in those mar-
kets to the benefit of consumers and should be encouraged.
Thus, a plaintiff challenging a bundled discount should have to
show that entry barriers207 would preclude the "hypothetical
equally efficient firm making only one of the products subject to
the bundled rebate"208 from expanding its scope so as to com-
pete with the bundle.
The plaintiff should also have to show entry barriers in the
market for the competitive product (the product already sold by
the hypothetical equally efficient rival), for the absence of such
barriers would preclude future supracompetitive pricing by the
discounter and would thus destroy the rationale for condemn-
ing a present discount. 20 9 Suppose that allocating the entire
amount of the discount to the competitive product results in be-
low-cost pricing so that a hypothetical equally efficient single-
product rival would be excluded. Suppose further that there are
low barriers to entry in the market for the competitive product.
In such circumstances, even if the discounter were to drive out
all competitors, it would not have the power to raise prices
above competitive levels because other rivals would respond to
the supracompetitive pricing by entering the market. 2 10 Thus,
206. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2003, supra note 21, 749, at 83.
207. An "entry barrier" or "barrier to entry" is "any factor that makes entry
into a market unprofitable, even as profits are being earned there." 3 AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 15, 729(a), at 345.
208. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2003, supra note 21, 749, at 83.
209. Condemning a present discount is warranted only if the discount is
likely to cause future supracompetitive pricing (after it successfully drives ri-
vals from the market).
210. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
589 (1986) ("[It is not enough simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly
pricing may breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the excess
profits."); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2
(1984) ("Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly prices eventually attract en-
try.").
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the Antitrust Law approach is deficient in that it fails to re-
quire proof of some possibility of recoupment through monopo-
listic pricing. 211 Before being allowed to enjoin a consumer-
friendly discount, a plaintiff should have to demonstrate the
likelihood of future supracompetitive pricing by showing that
there are barriers to entry in the market for the competitive
product.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: ABOVE-COST
BUNDLED DISCOUNTS ARE PRESUMPTIVELY LEGAL,
BUT A PLAINTIFF MAY REBUT THE PRESUMPTION BY
PROVING FACTS THAT DEMONSTRATE GENUINE
EXCLUSION OF A COMPETITIVE RIVAL
It seems, then, that each of these articulated approaches to
bundled discounts is problematic; each approach would either
overdeter, underdeter, or be overly difficult to administer. 212
Antitrust tribunals instead need an evaluative approach that
(1) will condemn those bundled discounts that are ultimately
likely to harm consumer welfare, (2) will not chill bundled dis-
counts that are not likely to cause long-run consumer harm,
and (3) is easily administrable. 213 An approach that presumes
211. Cf. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 222 (1993) (holding that below-cost prices that would exclude rivals are
not, by themselves, sufficient to establish anticompetitive harm; there must
also be a likelihood of recoupment).
212. To review, the per se legality approach fails adequately to account for
the ability of above-cost bundled discounts to drive out equally efficient rivals
and is justified only if there is no administrable means of distinguishing be-
tween pro- and anticompetitive above-cost bundled discounts. See supra notes
62-70 and accompanying text. The "raising rivals' costs" theory fails because
much procompetitive conduct raises rivals' costs, and there is no easily admin-
istrable test that will identify when raising rivals' costs is unjustifiable and
will not chill procompetitive behavior. See supra notes 103-14 and accompany-
ing text. The LePage's approach may force consumers to forego lower prices to
protect less efficient rivals (such as LePage's itself) and will discourage even
procompetitive bundled discounting by improperly burdening discounters with
having to justify their reduced prices by pointing to adequate cost savings. See
supra notes 139-56 and accompanying text. The Ortho Diagnostic approach is
difficult to administer, may lead to underdeterrence because the burden on
plaintiffs is too great, and may require multiple lawsuits if the "right" plaintiff
(the one best able to match the discounter's efficiency) does not bring the law-
suit. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text. And the Antitrust Law
approach would preclude discount cross-subsidization, which will frequently
be procompetitive and beneficial to consumers, and would deter bundled dis-
counts that could not lead to future supracompetitive pricing. See supra notes
202-11 and accompanying text.
213. As the Antitrust Law treatise puts it, "The difficult question [with re-
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the legality of above-cost bundled discounts, but would allow a
plaintiff to rebut that presumption by proving certain easily as-
certainable facts indicating genuine exclusion of an efficient ri-
val, would meet these criteria.
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Consistent with the general policy objectives of the anti-
trust laws, the ultimate goal of the evaluative approach should
be to promote consumer welfare by achieving the highest out-
put and lowest price possible. 214 Given that goal, the approach
should condemn bundled discounts that would drive out of
business those rivals that are more efficient producers than the
discounter, for those rivals would be able to produce-and thus
to sell-their products more cheaply than the discounter. In
addition, the approach should condemn bundled discounts that
would drive out rivals that are as efficient as the discounter, for
by reducing the number of such rivals, the discounter's conduct
would reduce the competition that increases output and drives
down prices. Finally (and more controversially), it would be de-
sirable to condemn bundled discounts that would exclude rivals
that currently are not as efficient as the discounter but would
likely become so if given the opportunity to develop economies
of scale. 215 If the label "competitive rival" is assigned to any ri-
val that is, or is likely to become, as efficient as the dis-
spect to bundled discounts] is the formulation of an administrable rule that
does not overreach and condemn competitive conduct." AREEDA & HOVENKAMP
SUPP. 2004, supra note 27, 749, at 183.
214. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (noting that "the
primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition,"
which frequently consists of "'cutting prices to increase business"' (quoting
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594)); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 367 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("As we have noted, the antitrust
laws are a 'consumer welfare prescription."' (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,
442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979))); Thomas A. Piraino Jr., The Antitrust Analysis of
Network Joint Ventures, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 5, 6 n.7 (1995) ("[T]he federal courts
make it clear that the goal of the antitrust laws is to enhance consumer wel-
fare by ensuring competitive markets that provide consumers with the maxi-
mum possible output of goods and services at the lowest possible prices.").
215. Compare, e.g., Elhauge, GPO Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at
33-34 (arguing that antitrust law should seek to prevent exclusion of even less
efficient rivals where the exclusionary tactic is preventing the rivals from at-
taining efficiencies), with POSNER, supra note 112, at 194-95 (defining the ex-
clusionary conduct the antitrust laws should police as conduct that is "likely in
the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's market an equally or more
efficient competitor"). See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 171, at 153-55
(discussing debate over whether less efficient rivals should receive protection).
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counter, 216 then an optimal evaluative approach should aim to
condemn bundled discounts that would drive "competitive ri-
vals" out of business. 217
Designing the approach to condemn such discounts is only
part of the objective, however. The approach should also avoid
improperly chilling procompetitive bundled discounts. It should
therefore be easy to administer (i.e., it should not require an
216. Rivals unlikely to achieve efficiencies equal to or greater than the dis-
counter would be "noncompetitive rivals," much the way the number 100
ranked tennis player in the world is a noncompetitive rival of the top-ranked
player. The number four ranked player, by contrast, is a competitive rival,
even though she is currently less "efficient" than the top player.
217. A goal of protecting those rivals that are as efficient as the bundled
discounter or are likely to become that efficient if afforded the opportunity to
grow is largely consistent with the various competing views on what consti-
tutes "exclusionary" unilateral conduct. Professor Hovenkamp has identified
four such views. See Hovenkamp, supra note 171, at 151-62. One view, es-
poused by Judge Richard A. Posner, identifies exclusionary conduct as conduct
that is "'likely in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's market an
equally or more efficient competitor."' Id. at 153 (quoting POSNER, supra note
112, at 194-95). The goal set forth here is largely consistent with that defini-
tion of exclusionary conduct, though it would call for condemnation of conduct
that would exclude rivals not yet as efficient as the discounter but likely to be-
come so if given the opportunity to grow. A second definition of exclusionary
conduct is espoused by some members of the so-called "post-Chicago" school
and maintains that conduct is exclusionary if it renders the discounter's rivals
less efficient. See Hovenkamp, supra note 171, at 158-59 (citing Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Steven C. Salop &
David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983)).
The goal proposed above is largely consistent with this "raising rivals' costs"
theory, for that theory cannot ultimately be concerned with protecting every
rival, but only those likely to achieve comparable efficiency. A third definition
of exclusionary conduct focuses on whether the defendant has sacrificed short-
run revenues or profits in exchange for larger revenues anticipated to materi-
alize later when the defendant's monopoly power has been created or
strengthened. See id. at 155. This "sacrifice-based" theory is largely consistent
with the goal stated above because the ultimate point of the sacrifice test is to
ensure that rivals that are equally efficient--or are likely to become so-are
not driven from the market. Preventing the sacrifice of current profits is not
an end in itself; rather, it is a means of determining whether a firm is engag-
ing in conduct that could drive out rivals society would like to have remaining
in the market. See Crane, supra note 1, at 41-42. Finally, the exclusionary
conduct test stated in the Antitrust Law treatise asks whether the practice at
issue (1) is reasonably capable of excluding rivals, (2) fails to provide adequate
consumer benefit, and (3) can be easily identified and condemned by a judicial
tribunal. See Hovenkamp, supra note 171, at 151-53 (discussing the exclu-
sionary conduct test set forth in 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 15,
651(a), at 72). The goal here is largely consistent with that definition be-
cause only discounts that would exclude equally efficient rivals, or those rivals
likely to become so, would meet all three criteria.
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amorphous and unpredictable "balancing" by a fact finder) and
should include clearly defined safe harbors that could not ex-
clude competitive rivals for bundled discounts. 218 Such safe
harbors-like the safe harbor that exempts above-cost, single-
product price cuts from predatory pricing challenges 219-would
permit businesses to engage in approved forms of bundled dis-
counting without fear of treble antitrust damages.
B. THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The following evaluative approach would achieve each of
these objectives: As long as a bundled discount results in a
price that exceeds the bundle's cost, the discount is legal unless
the plaintiff establishes that-
(1) there are barriers to entry (a) in the product market(s)
in which the plaintiff does not participate and (b) in the market
for the competitive product;
(2) the plaintiff cannot practicably coordinate with other
producers to create a competing bundle; and
(3) the plaintiff made a good faith offer to become a sup-
plier to the discounter but was rebuffed.
If the plaintiff proves each of these facts, the defendant may
nonetheless escape liability by showing that it rejected the
plaintiff's offer to become a supplier because either (a) the price
the plaintiff would have charged exceeded the defendant's cost
of producing the product, or (b) the quality of the plaintiff's
product was inferior to that of the defendant's product.
As explained below, this approach would identify and con-
demn bundled discounts that could actually drive a competitive
rival out of business, but it would preclude liability for dis-
counts that could not exclude a competitive rival. Moreover, it
would provide a trustworthy safe harbor for firms that wish to
offer procompetitive bundled discounts: those firms would be
assured of no liability as long as (1) the discounted price of the
package is above the package's cost, and (2) the discounter ac-
218. Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 171, at 148 ("A workable definition of ex-
clusionary conduct under § 2 of the Sherman Act must satisfy two criteria.
First, it must define anticompetitive exclusionary conduct with tolerable accu-
racy, in particular, without excessive false positives. Second, it must be admin-
istrable by a court, perhaps in a jury trial.").
219. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 222 (requiring, for predatory pricing liability, that "the prices complained
of [be] below an appropriate measure of [the defendant's] costs").
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cepts any mutually beneficial supply offers extended by its ri-
vals.
1. The Plaintiff's Required Showing
Before a judicial tribunal thwarts a bundled discount
(which provides immediate consumer benefit), the plaintiff
should be required to prove that it has done all it can do to
compete with the discounter by matching the discounter's offer.
The conventional wisdom, of course, is that a rival with a less
complete product line simply cannot compete with a bundled
discount, 220 unless it can lower the price of its competitive
product(s) by the total amount of the bundled discount. 22 1 In-
deed, the LePage's court asserted that the "principal anticom-
petitive effect" of bundled discounts is that "they may foreclose
portions of the market to a potential competitor who does not
manufacture an equally diverse group of products and who
therefore cannot make a comparable offer."222
But this reasoning incorrectly assumes that a rival "who
does not manufacture an equally diverse group of prod-
ucts ... cannot make a comparable offer." In actuality, there
are at least three ways a plaintiff facing a competitor's bundled
discount could "make a comparable offer" and thus stay in busi-
ness: (1) match the bundle itself by entering the product mar-
kets in which it does not currently participate and offering its
own competing bundle; (2) collaborate with other sellers in the
markets in which it does not participate to provide a competing
bundle; or (3) become a supplier of the bundled discounter, thus
effectively offering a competitive bundle consisting of its prod-
uct and those of the discounter. A determined rival would pur-
sue each of these options before conceding defeat, and the law
should require such self-help before permitting judicial inter-
vention to thwart immediate lower prices. The approach articu-
220. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP SUPP. 2003, supra note 21, 749, at 83-84
("Depending on the number of products that are aggregated and the cus-
tomer's relative purchases of each, even an equally efficient rival may find it
impossible to compensate for lost discounts on products that it does not pro-
duce.").
221. If the total amount of the bundled discount is less than the rival's
margin on the product or products it sells in competition with the bundle, then
the rival could stay in business by simply lowering the price of its competitive
product or products by the amount of the bundled discount. See Crane, supra
note 1, at 34-38.
222. LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004).
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lated above provides courts with a mechanism for ensuring that
judicial intervention is a last resort that is employed only after
the plaintiff has established that it has no viable means of stay-
ing in business by competing more vigorously.
a. Barriers to Entry in Other Product Markets and in the
Market in Which Plaintiff Participates
A determined rival's most obvious option for competing
with a bundled discount that exceeds the rival's total margin on
the products it sells in competition with the bundle 223 is to ex-
pand its scope by entering the market(s) for the bundled prod-
uct(s) it does not sell. For example, if a diversified medical sup-
ply company were offering discounts on bundles of trocars
(devices used in endoscopic surgery) and sutures (stitches),224 a
trocar manufacturer might be able to enter the sutures market
and offer its own competitive bundle. Of course, such entry
might be difficult for a host of reasons-e.g., the existence of
sutures patents, regulatory hurdles, long-term contracts, or
natural monopoly. 225 Indeed, most monopolization cases based
on bundled discounting would presumably involve a monopolist
cross-subsidizing its discount on the competitive products by
giving up margin on the monopoly product.226 The mere pres-
223. For a bundled discount whose total amount could be attributed to each
bundled product without driving the price of that product below cost, a com-
petitive rival's most obvious option would be to lower the price of its product
by the amount of the bundled discount. Since this response could only benefit
consumers, this sort of bundled discount should be per se legal. See Crane, su-
pra note 1, at 42-43.
224. See, e.g., Complaint, Conmed Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.,
(S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 6, 2003) (No. 03-CV-8800) (on file with author); Com-
plaint, Applied Med. Research Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., (C.D. Cal.
filed Sept. 5, 2003) (No. 03-CV-1329) (on file with author).
225. Importantly, the need to amass a large amount of capital to finance
scope expansion is not generally a barrier to entry. As the Antitrust Law trea-
tise explains:
If capital markets are working well, new investment will be made in
any market earning anything above competitive returns-a term de-
fined to include sufficient profit to attract new capital-regardless of
the absolute cost of entry .... [W]e assume that capital markets are
efficient in assembling groups of investors. At any rate, the plaintiff
wishing to show that the absolute cost of entry serves as an effective
barrier should be required to provide evidence that financing entry is
very difficult or impossible, notwithstanding good prospects that en-
try, once it occurs, will be sufficiently profitable to pay investors a
competitive rate of return.
2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 100, 421(b), at 67.
226. This is the plaintiffs' theory in the Johnson & Johnson, Inc. cases.
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ence of such monopoly profits would indicate that entry into the
"other" market was difficult.227 One can imagine, though, bun-
dled discount cases where the markets in which the challenger
does not participate are not monopolized; indeed, LePage's was
apparently such a case.228 Thus, the plaintiff should have to
show that barriers to entry would prevent it from expanding its
scope so as to replicate the challenged bundle. In most cases,
plaintiffs would probably have little trouble making this show-
ing, but requiring them to do so would prevent a plaintiff from
being able to avoid procompetitive scope expansion when such
expansion is feasible.
The plaintiff also should be required to show barriers to
entry in the market in which it participates. This showing,
unlike the one above (and the others required by the proposed
approach), is not designed to prove that the plaintiff has taken
all steps to compete on the merits but instead seeks to ensure
that the market in which the plaintiff participates (and which
the defendant is purportedly attempting to monopolize) is actu-
ally susceptible to monopolization. The law should not preclude
a bundled discount which provides a concrete and immediate
consumer benefit to "preserve competition" in a market that is
structurally incapable of being monopolized. Because barriers
to entry are necessary for monopolization of a market, 229 a
plaintiff should be required to show that the market in which it
competes is subject to such barriers.
Complaint, Conmed Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. (No. 03-CV-8800); Com-
plaint, Applied Med. Research Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. (No. 03-CV-
1329). In each case, the plaintiff claims that Johnson & Johnson, Inc. uses its
supracompetitive profits in the sutures market to fund a discount on trocars,
the product the plaintiff sells in competition with Johnson & Johnson, Inc.
227. See 2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 100, 420(a), at 57-59 (noting that
entry barriers are the reason for supracompetitive profits and that such profits
cannot exist absent entry barriers).
228. 3M was a monopolist in the transparent tape market-the market in
which LePage's participated. See LePage's Inc. v. 3M. Co., 324 F.3d 141, 146(3d Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) ("3M concedes it
possesses monopoly power in the United States transparent tape market, with
a 90% market share."). But there was no indication that 3M had monopoly
power in the markets for the other products covered by its bundled discounts.
See generally id.
229. See 2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 100, 420(a), at 58 (noting that ab-
sent barriers to entry, "the equilibrium price will be at long-run marginal cost,
the competitive level, no matter how concentrated the market" and that
"[w]hen these conditions are satisfied, no firm within a market can sustain
monopoly pricing").
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b. Collaborative Bundle Impracticable
A determined rival that was unable, because of barriers to
entry, to offer its own competitive bundle would seek to collabo-
rate with other firms to create a competitive bundle.230 For ex-
ample, if a firm selling products A, B, and C offered a reduced
price on a bundle of those products, its rival that sold only
product A could collaborate with sellers of products B and C to
collectively offer a competitive bundled discount.231 The sellers
of products B and C would presumably be willing to collaborate
with the seller of A, for they likewise would find themselves
disadvantaged by the bundled discount and would be seeking a
competitive offer.232 Assuming that the rival sellers were as ef-
ficient as the discounter or would likely become so if they ex-
panded their scale, 233 they should be able to allocate the total
230. Such "cross-seller bundling" is quite common. A recent trip to a Target
store revealed (among many others) the following cross-seller bundles: an
Olympus® digital voice recorder bundled with Duracell® batteries, Suave-for-
Men® body wash bundled with a Schick Xtreme 3® razor, Almay® mascara
bundled with Bausch & Lomb Renu® contact lens cleanser, Colgate Simply
White Night Plus® teeth-whitening cream bundled with a disposable Konica®
camera, a First-Alert® smoke detector bundled with Energizer® batteries, and
Soft Lips® lip balm bundled with an Apple i-Tunes® digital music download.
231. Consider, for example, a bundled discount on premium gin and vodka.
As of late 1999, Diageo PLC's Tanqueray brand gin commanded a more than
50% market share in the "imported premium gin" market. Diageo PLC Final
Results, REG. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 16, 1999, LEXIS, Company News Feed
Formerly Regulatory News Service File. Diageo also sells a premium vodka
called Tanqueray Sterling. See Adam Jones, The Art of Killing a Name Softly,
FIN. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at 11. Suppose Diageo sought to grow its somewhat
obscure Tanqueray vodka by offering a discount on bundled purchases of Tan-
queray gin and vodka. Given the popularity of Tanqueray gin, competing
vodka sellers would likely find this discount troubling; after all, purchasers
that decided to buy less Tanqueray vodka and more of another premium vodka
brand would find themselves losing a discount on popular Tanqueray gin.
Those vodka sellers, though, would not be without recourse: they could col-
laborate with sellers of other brands of premium gin (e.g., Bombay) to offer a
competitive bundle. It is highly unlikely, then, that the vodka sellers would be
"excluded" by Diageo's gin/vodka bundle.
232. Amici in the LePage's case recognized this possibility for single-
product competitors. See Brief for the Boeing Company et al., as Amici Curiae
at 18, 3M v. LePage's Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2932 (2004) (No. 02-1865), available at
2003 WL 22428377 ("LePage's should have the opportunity to team up with
3M's rivals in the other product markets to offer their own joint package deals
to large retailers (after all, sellers in other product areas presumably do not
wish to lose sales to 3M any more than LePage's does).").
233. Given efficient capital markets, rivals that are not currently as effi-
cient as the discounter but probably could become so if their market share
were expanded could likely obtain the financing necessary to fund a below-cost
discount for long enough to expand market share enough to achieve the pro-
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value of the bundled discount among themselves and to offer a
competitive bundle. Thus, a plaintiff challenging a bundled dis-
count should have to prove-prior to securing an order enjoin-
ing the discounts (or awarding treble damages)-that it could
not have collaborated with sellers of products within the other
product markets to offer a competitive bundle.234 The plaintiff
could discharge this burden by proving either that there were
no sellers in the other markets with whom it could collaborate
or that it made a good faith collaboration offer to those sellers,
including an offer to reduce revenue on its product to the level
of its average variable cost,235 but was rebuffed by the other
product sellers. Requiring such proof would ensure that the
plaintiff had earnestly pursued procompetitive collaborations
with sellers in the other product markets covered by the bun-
dle, so that judicial condemnation of the discount was a last re-
sort.
c. Good Faith Offer to Sell to Discounter
A determined rival who could neither enter the other prod-
uct markets to offer its own competitive bundle nor collaborate
ductive efficiencies necessary to drive costs below price. See supra notes 100-
02 and accompanying text.
234. Explicit coordination among firms competing in the various product
markets represented by products within the bundle may be unnecessary if
those firms reduce their prices from supracompetitive levels. Professor Crane
has illustrated this point as follows:
Suppose, for example, that Multi-Firm makes five products-A, B, C,
D, and E-and typically sells each for $10, with a marginal cost of
production of $6 per unit. Multi-Firm decides to offer customers a new
package discount-10 percent off of each product in its portfolio, but
only if the customer purchases one unit of each product. Suppose fur-
ther that Multi-Firm has five competitors, each of which produces
only one of the five products and has the same price and cost struc-
ture as Multi-Firm. None of the five competitor firms can match
Multi-Firm's entire package discount individually and remain profit-
able .... But if each of the five competitor firms lowers its price by $1
on its own product, each can profitably sell the goods at the same ef-
fective price as Multi-Firm's package discount price.
In a market with reasonably good, low-cost information, and firms
with reasonably equivalent strength, one would expect implicit coor-
dination of price cuts by the five competitive firms, leading to across-
the-board price cuts and something close to egalitarian absorption of
the package discount by each of the five competitive firms.
Crane, supra note 1, at 31-32.
235. Proof of an offer price at this level should be required because a com-
petitor willing to exhaust all competitive options would lower its revenue de-
mands to this point-a point that would permit it to stay in business but not
to earn supracompetitive profits.
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with other sellers to do so would still have at least one option
for staying in the market: it could become a supplier to the
bundled discounter.236 If the rival were at least as efficient as
the bundled discounter, or would likely become so by expanding
its scale,23 7 it could offer to supply the discounter for a price the
discounter would find attractive (i.e., a price at or below the
discounter's own cost of producing and distributing the prod-
uct). Thus, any bundled discounter that was not in reality util-
izing its discounts as a means of excluding rivals would be will-
ing to accept a "competitive rival's" 238 offer to become a
supplier. 239
To see how a rival disadvantaged by a bundled discount
may remain in the market by offering to supply the discounter,
consider what has happened with the small regional airlines
that in recent years have found themselves unable to compete
with the major air carriers. A significant impediment to these
smaller airlines is the major carriers' ability to offer a type of
bundled discount-a price for a "bundle" of flights going from
departure point to hub to destination that is significantly lower
than the sum of the prices of two flights, one from departure
point to hub and the other from hub to destination.240 A smaller
carrier that wanted to compete with this discount but flew only
one leg of the journey (either between departure point and hub
city or between hub city and destination, but not both) would
have to absorb the entire amount of the package discount on
236. Cf. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING
ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 184 (1994) (noting that "greater
efficiency is an ideal way to overcome an 'entry barrier,"' for the more efficient,
but foreclosed, rival may begin supplying the competitor responsible for the
foreclosure).
237. If the rival were not yet as efficient a producer as the discounter but
would likely become so if its scale were expanded, it could probably secure the
financing necessary to fund a below-cost discount for long enough to expand its
scale to achieve the productive efficiencies that would drive its costs below
price. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (defining "competitive
rival").
239. Cf. ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS
403-04 (1985) (observing that monopolist engaged in tying would purchase
tied product from more efficient rivals).
240. For example, a United Airlines flight from St. Louis to Chicago
(United's hub) to Green Bay, Wisconsin might cost $200, whereas purchasing
separate flights from St. Louis to Chicago and then from Chicago to Green Bay
might cost a total of $300 ($125 for the St. Louis to Chicago leg and $175 for
the Chicago to Green Bay leg). This is, in effect, a bundled discount of $100.
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the single leg it offered. 241 This requirement would frequently
require the regional airline to price below its cost. The regional
airlines, however, have not been driven out of business by the
major carriers' bundled discounts but have instead remained in
business (and have thrived, in fact) by becoming suppliers to
the major carriers. 242 Similarly, single-product producers find-
ing themselves hampered by a bundled discount may be able to
stay in business, and thrive, by becoming suppliers of the dis-
counter. A rival attacking a bundled discount therefore should
be required to prove that it made a good faith offer to become a
supplier of the discounter but was rebuffed. The discounter's
rejection of the supply offer would provide prima facie evidence
that the discount was being used to exclude a competitive ri-
val.243
The Supreme Court recognized in Aspen Skiing Co. v. As-
pen Highlands Skiing Corp.244 that a refusal to cooperate with
a rival may have such evidentiary significance. The defendant
in that case (Ski Company) owned three of the four ski areas in
the Aspen, Colorado area.245 It had for years cooperated with
the plaintiff (Highlands), the owner of the fourth ski area, in
jointly issuing a multiday, all-area lift ticket.246 After High-
lands refused to accept a lower percentage of revenues from the
joint ticket, Ski Company discontinued the ticket. 247 Concerned
that it would lose business without some sort of joint ski area
offering, Highlands undertook several measures to recreate the
package deal on its own, going so far as attempting to purchase
ticket vouchers to Ski Company's skiing areas at retail price.
248
After Ski Company resisted even that tactic, Highlands sued it
for monopolization. 249 Ski Company defended by arguing that it
241. For example, a regional airline flying between Chicago and the major
cities in Wisconsin (but not to St. Louis) would have to discount its Chicago to
Green Bay flight to $75 to remain competitive with United's bundled discount.
242. See Eric Wieffering, Engine of Change, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May
11, 2003, at 1D (documenting successful supply relationships between small
regional and major air carriers and noting that "Northwest [Airlines] and most
other major network carriers experienced a decline in traffic in 2002 but traffic
on most regional carriers soared").
243. As explained below, the inference that the discounter was engaging in
exclusionary conduct would be rebuttable. See infra Part III.B.2.
244. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
245. Id. at 587-89.
246. Id. at 589-92.
247. Id. at 593.
248. Id. at 593-94.
249. Id. at 595.
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had no duty to engage in joint marketing with a competitor. 250
On that point, the Supreme Court concluded that Ski Company
was "surely correct," for "even a firm with monopoly power has
no general duty to engage in a joint marketing program with a
competitor."251 The Court emphasized, though, that refusal to
participate in a cooperative venture could have "evidentiary
significance," 252 and it upheld the jury's conclusion that Ski
Company had engaged in exclusionary conduct.2 3 Just as the
refusal to engage in a cooperative venture was evidence of ex-
clusionary conduct in Aspen Skiing, a bundled discounter's re-
fusal to accept a rival's offer to supply one of the bundled prod-
ucts at a price below the discounter's cost would evince the
exclusionary character of the discounter's pricing scheme.
Thus, the Supreme Court would likely approve an evaluative
approach that drew evidentiary significance from the fact that
a multi-product discounter was refusing to cooperate with a
single-product rival that had extended an attractive supply of-
fer.254
250. Id. at 600 ("In this Court, Ski Co. contends that even a firm with mo-
nopoly power has no duty to engage in joint marketing with a competi-
tor .... ).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 601.
253. Id. at 610-11.
254. While the Supreme Court recently characterized Aspen Skiing as be-
ing "at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability," Verizon Communications
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004), asser-
tions the Court made in connection with that characterization indicate that
the rationale of Aspen Skiing would apply here and that the Court would ap-
prove an inference of exclusionary conduct from a bundled discounter's refusal
to accept a supply offer from a more efficient rival. In defending Aspen
Skiing's holding, the Court noted that Ski Company's refusal to cooperate
with Highlands when doing so would increase its revenues, suggested that it
was attempting to exclude Highlands in the hope of earning future monopoly
profits that would offset the losses immediately incurred by its failure to coop-
erate with Highlands. See id. at 409 (noting that Ski Company's "unilateral
termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing
suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticom-
petitive end," and that Ski Company's "unwillingness to renew the ticket even
if compensated at retail price revealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent" and
"suggest[ed] a calculation that its future monopoly retail price would be
higher" (emphasis in original)). Similarly, a bundled discounter's rejection of a
profit-enhancing supply offer from a rival would suggest a willingness to for-
sake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end (and future monop-
oly profits) and should therefore permit an inference of exclusionary conduct.
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2. The Discounter's Rebuttal Opportunity
The first part of the proposed evaluative approach (the
plaintiff's prima facie case) is designed to ensure that a judicial
order thwarting a bundled discount is a last resort pursued
only after the complaining plaintiff has exhausted all means of
competing on the merits. It thus prevents judicial orders that
would allow plaintiffs to shirk the difficulties of proconsumer
competition. But a plaintiff's diligence in pursuing competitive
options is not, by itself, sufficient to entitle that plaintiff to a
court order precluding a bundled discount. As in any competi-
tion, trying is not enough; even those who try very hard some-
times deserve to lose. To permit a diligent but less talented
competitor to be defeated is not to sanction anything anticom-
petitive. Indeed, vigorous competition implies that there will be
losers-that less efficient firms will not be artificially propped
up but will be driven out of business by those that are more ef-
ficient. Antitrust tribunals therefore need some means of iden-
tifying, within the class of firms that have pursued all competi-
tive options, those rivals that are competitive with the
discounter (i.e. those that are, or are likely to become, as effi-
cient as the discounter 255). The proposed evaluative approach
would accomplish this "weeding" by allowing defendants a re-
buttal opportunity.
If a plaintiff proves that it cannot compete with the bun-
dled discount because (1) there are high entry barriers into the
other product markets, (2) a collaborative bundle is impossible,
and (3) the discounter rejected a good faith offer by the plaintiff
to become a supplier, the discounter should still be able to
avoid liability by proving that the plaintiff's best "supply offer,"
which presumably would reflect the maximum efficiencies the
plaintiff could attain after reaching minimum efficient scale,
256
was not good enough. Specifically, the discounter could avoid
liability by showing either that its costs were less than the
price demanded by the plaintiff or that the plaintiff's product
was inferior. If the discounter could make either showing, it
255. See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
256. A plaintiff that could achieve productive efficiencies by expanding its
scale would take account of those efficiencies in determining its offer price.
The price offered might thus be below the plaintiff's current costs, but, given
efficient capital markets, the plaintiff should be able to obtain financing to
sustain a temporary below-cost price if such pricing would permit it to expand
its scale to achieve productive efficiencies that would push its costs below the
price offered. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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could rebut the contention that the bundled discount was ex-
cluding a rival that was, or was likely to become, 257 equally effi-
cient.
The proposed approach thus ultimately involves comparing
the cost structures of the complaining rival and the discounter.
In that sense, the approach resembles the Ortho Diagnostic ap-
proach, which required a plaintiff challenging a bundled dis-
count to prove that it is as efficient a producer of the competi-
tive product as the discounter.258 But the proposed approach is
superior to the Ortho Diagnostic approach in terms of adminis-
trability and reliability. The plaintiff's achievable cost 259 would
be established not by potentially self-serving testimony from
the plaintiff's own witnesses, but by the plaintiff's actual sup-
ply offer-i.e., the lowest price for which the plaintiff would sell
its products to the discounter. Presumably, the offer price
would be neither below the plaintiff's actual cost (because the
discounter might accept the offer, and the plaintiff would have
to perform) nor significantly above it (because an inflated offer
price might exceed the discounter's costs, permitting the dis-
counter to refuse the offer with impunity).260 Thus, the pro-
posed evaluative approach would force the plaintiff to reveal a
close approximation of its true cost and would likely generate a
more accurate cost figure than the Ortho Diagnostic approach,
which would determine plaintiff's cost on the basis of possibly
self-serving testimony from plaintiff's witnesses. In addition,
the discounter's cost information would be produced more
cheaply and reliably, for the burden to produce that informa-
tion would be on the discounter itself, not on the plaintiff. As
noted, ascertaining another party's costs is difficult;261 the de-
257. See supra notes 233, 237.
258. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); see supra notes 158-69 and accompanying text.
259. There is, of course, a difference here in that the proposed approach
focuses on the plaintiff's achievable cost (its expected cost after achieving an-
ticipated economies of scale) rather than actual current cost, the focus of the
Ortho Diagnostic approach.
260. A plaintiff that believed it was a more efficient producer than the dis-
counter might attempt to maximize its profits on a supplier contract by offer-
ing a price in excess of its own cost but below what it believed the defendant's
cost to be. Doing so would be risky, however, for if the plaintiff overestimated
the discounter's cost and offered a price in excess of that cost, the discounter
could reject the offer with impunity. Thus, a plaintiff, likely ignorant of its dis-
counting rival's costs, would probably make an offer approximating its own
cost.
261. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
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fendant discounter is in a much better position to produce evi-
dence regarding its costs. Thus, the proposed approach, while
resembling Ortho Diagnostic in terms of its ultimate focus (i.e.,
the relative efficiencies of the discounter and complaining ri-
vals), is superior in terms of administrability.
In the end, the proposed evaluative approach would
achieve each of the goals articulated above.262 The approach
would condemn bundled discounts that exclude competitors
that had competed vigorously by pursuing all competitive op-
tions, and were, or were likely to become, as efficient as the dis-
counter. The approach would not condemn bundled discounts if
the complainant had not pursued all competitive options or was
not likely to be able to match the discounter's efficiency. More-
over, the approach would facilitate procompetitive bundled dis-
counting by providing a clear safe harbor: a bundled discounter
could avoid antitrust liability by ensuring that it accepted any
supplier's offer where the price offered was less than the dis-
counter's own cost (an offer that would be in its economic inter-
est to accept). Finally, the approach would be easily adminis-
trable, for the relevant facts are relatively easy to ascertain,
and proof burdens are allocated so that the party with the bur-
den of proof on a matter is most likely to have access to the
relevant evidence.
C. POSSIBLE SHORTCOMINGS: "PHONY DISCOUNTS" AND
COLLUSION BETWEEN DISCOUNTERS AND SUPPLIER RIVALS
There are, however, a couple of potential shortcomings that
merit consideration. First, firms engaging in other types of po-
tentially anticompetitive pricing practices might exploit the
proposed evaluative approach to increase the difficulty of suc-
cessfully challenging the practices. Recognizing that above-cost
bundled discounts are usually beneficial to consumers, the pro-
posed evaluative approach presumes their legality and places a
somewhat heavy proof burden on rivals asserting legal chal-
lenges. Professor Elhauge has argued that affording special
protection to bundled discounts may simply encourage creative
firms to insulate anticompetitive bundling or tying practices by
artificially inflating prices and then offering phony "discounts"
off those higher prices.263 For example, a firm could engage in
262. See supra Part III.A (setting goals for evaluative approach).
263. Professor Elhauge writes:
[A]nything called a "discount" for agreeing to the loyalty or bundling
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de facto tying by artificially increasing the separate price of the
tied products and then offering a substantial bundled "dis-
count" off that higher price.264 Under the proposed evaluative
approach, a challenger would bear a heavier proof burden (be-
cause there is a bundled "discount") than would a plaintiff chal-
lenging de facto tying that had not been made to resemble a
discount. 265 Accordingly, Professor Elhauge concludes, it would
be unwise to provide special protection (e.g., a presumption of
legality) to a pricing practice merely because it is labeled a
bundled discount.
The possibility of phony discounts need not create concern,
however, for the strategy, where plausible, could be easily iden-
tified. A phony discount could be accomplished by either artifi-
cially hiking prices prior to the discount, precluding prices from
falling following the occurrence of some notable event that
should have caused their decrease, or precluding prices from
naturally falling in a slow and steady fashion. The first situa-
tion, a prediscount price hike, would be easy enough to demon-
strate by pointing to historical price data. If prices were not ac-
tually increased prior to the discount but were instead
artificially precluded from falling,266 the plaintiff could show
condition could equally be called a "penalty" on those who refuse to
conform to that condition.
The higher price charged to those who violate the loyalty or bun-
dling condition may be inflated artificially. If one accepted the propo-
sition that no discount for agreeing to an exclusionary condition could
ever be challenged unless the discounted price were below cost, "then
any firm could immunize its exclusive-dealing agreements from anti-
trust scrutiny by the simple expedient of inflating the price and then
offering a rebate conditioned on exclusivity." Thus, the mere existence
of a discount proves nothing.
Elhauge, GPO Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at 31 (quoting Elhauge, su-
pra note 61, at 698 n.53).
264. While some courts have held that tying cannot occur if the tied prod-
ucts are available separately, see Shop & Save Food Mkts., Inc. v. Pneumo
Corp., 683 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1982); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427
F. Supp. 1089, 1112, 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 575 F.2d
1056, 1061 n.3 (3d Cir. 1978); Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 1994-2
TRADE CAS. 70,827 (N.D. Cal. 1993), the majority view is that a sufficiently
large discount for buying the products together may constitute de facto tying if
it has coercive effects. 10 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, & ELHAUGE, supra note 156,
1758, at 323 ("[We join most courts in asking whether the discount has an
effect similar to an outright refusal to sell tying product A separately.").
265. A plaintiff alleging de facto tying would have to prove a low proportion
of separate sales. See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text (discussing
test described in 10 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP, & ELHAUGE, supra note 156,
1758, at 323).
266. Professor Elhauge contends that one cannot merely look to historical
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that there was no actual discount by producing evidence of
whatever factor should have caused a notable decrease in
prices (e.g., an abrupt reduction in the cost of an input). Absent
both a prediscount price hike and a notable occurrence that
should have caused a price decrease, artificial price inflation
could occur only if the defendant artificially sustained the price
above its profit-maximizing level for an extended time period
(i.e., long enough for the difference between the actual price
and the diminishing "natural" price level to grow to the amount
of the discount). A rational seller would sacrifice profits in this
manner 267 only if it believed it could later offer a phony bundled
discount, drive its rivals out of business, and recoup its losses
by charging supracompetitive prices. The tactic would therefore
require a good bit of faith on the part of a seller and is unlikely
to be pursued. Thus, the strategic behavior with which Profes-
sor Elhauge is concerned either would be easy to identify (in
the first two circumstances discussed above) or is implausible
(in the third).
A second potential problem with the proposed evaluative
approach is that it might not prevent consumer harm, even if it
prevents foreclosure of competitive rivals, because it invites co-
operation among competitors and thereby increases the risk of
collusive output reduction. 268 Consider, for example, a situation
prices (to determine whether there was a prediscount price hike) to determine
whether prices have been artificially inflated, for the inflation may have been
accomplished by stalling price reductions that otherwise would have occurred.
He explains:
Nor does history provide a good baseline for determining whether a
loyalty or bundled discount has really lowered prices. Prices may be
declining for unrelated reasons, including changes in costs and de-
mand, but [prices may] have that decline dampened by the market-
wide foreclosure produced by exclusionary conditions.
Elhauge, GPO Agreement Analysis, supra note 71, at 31-32.
267. Holding price constant when marginal cost has fallen will fail to
maximize the seller's immediate profit. "[S]ince the profit-maximizing price is
determined by the intersection of the marginal revenue and marginal cost
curves, any reduction in marginal costs shows up as a lower profit-maximizing
price." 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 103,
at 44 n.21 (2d ed. 2002). Hence, during the period in which a seller artificially
held price constant in the face of decreasing costs, its profits would be reduced
from what they otherwise could be.
268. See Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004) ("[C]ompelling negotiation between competitors
may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion."). See generally Christo-
pher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515 (2004) (ar-
guing that a primary objective of antitrust law is, and should be, to create dis-
trust between competitors).
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where the bundled discounter accepts its single-product rivals'
offers to become suppliers (so the rivals are not foreclosed) but
then cuts its own production and charges a supracompetitive
price for the products supplied by its rivals. The proposed
evaluative approach would not condemn the bundled discount
that motivated the rivals to become suppliers; yet, consumers
would be harmed by the discounter's conduct.
But the proposed evaluative approach would not sanction
this sort of consumer harm. As long as the supplier rivals are
free to sell directly to the discounter's customers, their contin-
ued presence in the market should prevent the discounter from
being able to cut its own production and raise prices above
competitive levels. Should the discounter try that tack, its sup-
plier rivals would increase their production and offer prices
lower than the discounter's.269 But what if the discounter cut a
deal with the rivals, offering to share its supracompetitive prof-
its (e.g., to make some sort of side payment) if the rivals would
not undersell it? That, of course, would be a price-fixing agree-
ment that is per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.270 It would also be rather easy to identify, for output would
fall, price would rise, and the seller would be unable to articu-
late a valid reason for its decision to cut production. Antitrust
liability should attach to this agreement, once materialized, but
there is no compelling reason to impose antitrust liability in
anticipation of such an agreement.27 1
CONCLUSION
Bundled discounts present a classic example of what Judge
Frank H. Easterbrook calls "the puzzle of exclusionary con-
duct."272 That puzzle exists because "competitive and exclu-
269. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 210, at 2 ('"Monopoly prices
eventually attract entry."); Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media
Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. REG. 171, 209 (2002) (noting that
"any attempt to increase price can often induce existing players to expand
output as well as attract entry by new firms").
270. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940)
(holding that an agreement among competitors to reduce output, like an
agreement to fix prices, is per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
271. Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 112, at 347 ("Instead of making predic-
tions that are impossible to test-and will injure consumers if wrong-wait to
see what happens. If monopolistic prices happen later, prosecute then.").
272. Id. at 345.
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sionary conduct look alike,"2 73 and it is often difficult for courts
to condemn the latter without discouraging the former. With
respect to bundled discounts, it can be difficult to tell which are
procompetitive (i.e., which ones reflect efficiencies and/or repre-
sent a whittling away of supracompetitive prices) and which
are likely to injure consumers in the long run by driving out
those rivals whose continued presence in the market is desir-
able. The "puzzle," then, is to develop an easily administrable
evaluative approach that will identify and condemn only those
bundled discounts that could injure consumers by excluding ri-
vals that are, or are likely to become, as efficient as the dis-
counter.
This Article has sought to solve that puzzle. The proposed
evaluative approach would presume the legality of above-cost
bundled discounts but would allow that presumption to be re-
butted by a plaintiff that had exhausted all viable options for
offering a competitive discount and was, or was likely to be-
come, as efficient as the discounter. Specifically, the plaintiff
would have to show that it could not stay in business by either
lowering its price(s) on the competitive product(s), entering new
markets to create its own bundle, collaborating with other sell-
ers to offer a competitive bundled discount, or becoming a sup-
plier to the discounter. If the plaintiff made such a showing, the
discounter could still avoid liability by proving that it rejected
the plaintiff's supply offer because the offer simply was not
good enough (i.e., because the plaintiff could not produce the
competitive product as efficiently as the discounter). When a
plaintiff made the required prima facie showing and the defen-
dant failed to justify its rejection of the plaintiff's supply offer,
a court would be justified in concluding that the bundled dis-
counting would exclude competitive rivals and was therefore
anticompetitive on balance. When a plaintiff failed to make its
prima facie showing (and thus failed to prove it had exhausted
competitive options) or the defendant proved that acceptance of
the plaintiff's supply offer would have been a bad business de-
cision for the defendant (and thus established that the plaintiff
was a less efficient producer), a court would not be justified in
forcing consumers to forego the defendant's discounts to protect
the plaintiff.
273. Id.; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1710 (1986) ("[I]t is almost impossible to distinguish ex-
clusion from hard competition.").
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